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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE CAMBRIDGE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY (II).

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THE reason why explanation in terms of endless qualities is unsatisfactory is not because it can never be completed, as Wisdom seems to think, but because the qualities are not the thing, however much they may help to determine the thing. We know what a cow is without such an infinite enumeration, although we may not be able exhaustively to define it, just because essence is not quality. We know essences in some sense, and so also does Wisdom; otherwise he could not and should not speak of cows at all. And the fact that we cannot exhaustively define the essence in terms of its qualities simply proves that it is more than its qualities, that the whole is always more than the sum of its parts (a principle which holds good everywhere outside of mathematics). This applies also to the whole universe. It is true that everything leads to everything else, as Plato said, and that consequently we shall not know the part until we know the whole of which it is a part; that the full essence will be grasped only in the light of the nature of the whole. But this does not mean that we do not in some sense already know individual essences, and that we cannot enquire into them, thereby increasing our knowledge both of them and of the whole. This, however, is not merely a matter of analysis, but rather a synthetic act of grasping more fully the unity and the nature of the unity of which they are qualities. But if Wisdom is going to rule out essence simply because we cannot fully and exhaustively define what a cow is, or what "cow" means, then he ought not to use any universal terms. The fact of the matter is that he is not

prepared to admit the reality of anything other than a sensible quality, and in doing so he deprives himself of the right to use the term "cow" or predicate anything of it. Antisthenes, who long ago denied the validity of universal terms like "horse" and "cow", saw also that he could not then admit the validity of predication. But Wisdom and his followers want to throw their cake in the fire and at the same time go on eating it.

It is worth noting too that, whatever difficulties Wisdom and his friends may have in accepting and understanding the concept of essence and its relation to the perceived qualities or characteristics, the thing that most other people will find obscure and difficult to understand is how the statement "This is a cow" is related to such statements as X has four legs, horns, etc., none of which are necessary. Yet to Wisdom this is perfectly simple and obvious! On his own showing, however, these perceived qualities or characteristics form a certain character complex, a certain unity, or togetherness of qualities, which he feels justifies him in applying the unitary name "cow" to them. He thus admits that he knows something more than a series of sensible qualities, for he knows that one cow is like another and therefore he knows a certain unity or character complex, as well as the "likeness", both of which, as Plato and Kant have amply demonstrated, are not and cannot be grasped by sense alone, but by some other faculty, such as reason or the intellect, which Wisdom finds so obscure. As Plato shows in the *Theaetetus* 181f and *Parmenides* 129d, sense-perception at best is only part of knowledge. For common terms are known, but not by perception. It is the mind and not the senses that understands things like existence, likeness and unlikeness, etc. The senses must meet in a unity somewhere. Truth and falsehood reside not in the senses but in the mind which receives and reflects on their reports. This faculty which correlates the data and apprehends the outer form of objects is not a sense but a mental faculty. There can be no apprehension without intellection. For Plato, however, the common terms are not Kantian Categories; they are *objects* of apprehension, not

subjective constructions. We read Forms *in* not *into* the data of experience.

What many of us, following Plato, find obscure and difficult to understand is how such an uncertain and misleading faculty as sense can grasp entities which are themselves always changing and unstable, in such a way as to say anything about them, other than that "they are and they are not", i.e. to have knowledge of them. For if things are always changing there is nothing fixed for words to refer to; language has no fixed meaning and we cannot even say that perception is knowledge. Wisdom, therefore, is under an obligation surely, to explain this mystery to us, as well as how and by what faculty he himself apprehends, as he claims to be able to do, non-sensible things like unity, togetherness, character complex, likeness, etc., which alone justifies him in applying the term "cow".

The truth of the matter is that he objects to the operation of any other faculty as obscure and difficult to understand because it is not reducible to or expressible in terms of sense-perception. In other words, it is Wisdom himself who is making ridiculous and self-contradictory requests, to the effect that something non-sensible should be expressed in sensible terms. For one of his strongest objections to the realist and transcendentalist answers (and this seems to be shared by all the "friends of Cambridge") is that they are misleading in that they suggest a false analogy. The doctor's observations of the pulse and temperature, etc., of his patient, they are fond of pointing out, may suggest to him and lead him to infer that there is an observable entity, viz., the germ, in the blood over and above the symptoms he observes. The transcendentalist answer likewise suggests that over and above having horns, four legs, etc., there is something further, viz., an essence, and that just as it requires a microscope to see the germ, so it requires reason or intuition or the "eye of the soul" to see the essence. But, say they, with obvious relish, the "eye of the soul" isn't a microscope! To which we need only reply: but who, apart from themselves, ever

said that it was? Or that if it were it could therefore explain or account for our knowledge and experience as we find it? For that knowledge and experience is not just of a series of perceptions, but of a cow; not merely of isolated unrelated atomic sensations, but of a whole of parts, which sense-perception, however acute, cannot explain, except as Hume did, in the sense of explaining it away.

Not only, therefore, is Wisdom's argument full of contradictory statements of this kind, but it also seems to reveal a profound lack of appreciation of what the philosophers who talked about these things were really saying or meaning. It is not the case, for example, that for Plato the essence is something merely over and above the qualities of the thing, another kind of entity or reality existing in a realm of its own. The Forms are *in* particulars, *in* sensible things, *in* the physical world, and make these things real *by being in them*. The Form is what constitutes the being and character of the individual thing, which is what it is and real in so far, and only in so far, as it partakes of the Forms.[1]

It is because Wisdom persists in taking the essence or Form as a separate kind of entity or reality "subsisting", as he puts it, in another realm over and above the sensible thing (which of course is also inconsistent with his expecting it to be perceptible or discoverable as a quality among other qualities) that he is able to accuse such philosophers of what he calls "metaphysical double vision". For he naively suggests that when such people talk about essences, forms, classes or universals, they imagine that if there are, say, six goats in a field then there are really seven entities, viz., the six indivi-

[1] See *Republic* 476 A where Forms are said to be "mixed up" (*κοινωνίασματων*) with bodies and corporeal objects, and thus to constitute their determining element. Not only in the *Republic*, but especially throughout the later dialogues, it is constantly emphasised by Plato that without the presence (*παρουσία*) of Forms in particular things the particular things would not exist, except as some sort of chaos; *Laws* (903A) and *Tim.* (30A, etc.). The existence of the sensible world would not be possible apart from the Forms, and without some apprehension of Forms we could not *know* that it exists, much less be aware of its nature. And in the *Parmenides* he stresses just this point, that the Form is *not another thing*, and (at 133B ff.) considers and dismisses as fallacious the criticism that there is an "unbridged gulf".

duals and the class of goats, within the field; and that they afflict themselves by wondering how it is, since all that we ever perceive are individual goats, that we can know that over and above these there is also a class of goats. This they call a super-sensible or rational entity, thereby creating epistemological puzzles for themselves by taking the two things to be two different sorts of being, or as belonging to different realms of being.

But this is a caricature of the Philosopher, and particularly of Plato, for genuine philosophers do not "create" puzzles. On the contrary they attempt to solve them, and it was just to solve the epistemological problem of how it comes about that we know, as we undoubtedly do, a unitary object when all that we can ever find is a series of sensible qualities —the problem which Wisdom persists in ignoring or explaining away—that such theories were put forward by Plato and others.

Further, such philosophers would say that it is only those people who insist on thinking of essences, universals, class concepts, etc., as sensible data, i.e., of the unity that unites the whole as itself an element among the elements it unites, who suffer from "metaphysical double vision". None of the philosophers who have made provision for such intellectual data or elements in their systems have behaved so unintelligently. And they would say that if Wisdom does not see or know a cow, and not merely a series of sense-data, which on his own showing are capable of infinite enumeration, then he is "metaphysically *blind*" and not merely afflicted on occasions with "double vision"; and that consequently he ought not to talk about cows at all, but only about indefinite series of sensations—though how he could possibly do even this is a mystery! But the fact that he can, as we have discovered, distinguish a cow from a goat shows that he does *know* in some sense *what* it is. He will, however, have nothing to do with reason, intellect, or any such obscure faculty. Moreover, he thinks these very queer ways of knowing, or "problematic inferences of a very peculiar kind",

because they involve saying that we know something that is not sense-data, or that from sense-data we can infer with probability that there are chairs—that is to say, that we can infer from Y's, which are the only things we have ever seen, to X's that we have never seen—in the same sort of way that we infer germs in the blood from bodily symptoms. Such a procedure seems to him obscure and unsatisfactory; but the fact that he holds the view he does shows beyond doubt that he is still arguing in terms of the Verification Principle and wanting verification in sense-experience.

It is interesting to look briefly at Wisdom's own method of curing people whom he thinks afflicted with "metaphysical double vision", for this will bring out what we mean when we say that he explains things by explaining them away. The simplest and most effective method, we are told, of removing the puzzles is definition. That is to say, we state the reductive analysis that the statement "a class of six members is in a field" means the same as "six individuals are in the field". Most people, he thinks, will be inclined to agree that these two mean the same, and by accepting the reductive analysis, as the Positivists do, will have their puzzle solved, for they will now see being not as double but as single. The "double vision" will vanish and with it the epistemological problem about the connection between the two sorts of being. In such cases, it is claimed, simple reductive analysis or definition does the trick! In other words, the problem is solved by accepting an empirical analysis which Wisdom himself has already shown to be inadequate to explain the facts of experience; that is to say, by simply giving up one's conviction that the thing is *not* merely a series of sensible qualities!

Now of course if people are prepared to do this kind of thing with any of their problems then the problem is "solved" in the sense that there is no longer any problem *for them,* because they have deliberately closed their eyes to it—all of which is ridiculous and self-contradictory, for it amounts to saying that the problem which they saw is "solved" by their now accepting the fact that there is no

problem, i.e., that there is and there isn't a problem! And if Wisdom really believes that many of us are prepared to "abandon our convictions" in this easy manner, by accepting something already seen to be unsatisfactory, then he is very naive indeed.

Of course he explains what is to be done when the individual refuses to accept the "translation", i.e., of one type of expression involving physical objects, nations, necessary connection, etc., into another in terms of sensations, individual citizens, usage of language, etc. When this happens what he recommends is that we point out to the individual that although the situation is so complicated that we cannot state the exact equivalents, nevertheless the fact that we cannot get an exact translation does not mean that the "higher level statement" (as they sometimes call it) is not talking about the same sort of thing as the "lower level" one. The technique usually adopted on these occasions is technically known as "the slide", and consists in "working on" a person and trying by suitable talk and examples, to get him to admit the similarity of cases where he has a tendency to "see double" to others where he has no such tendency; and thus to inveigle him into giving up one of his contradictory desires or demands. Space does not permit an examination of this extremely questionable procedure here. It is sufficient to say that it is based solely on analogy, traditionally held to be the most fallacious form of argument and the one most suitable for sophistical purposes, or to establish an identity where there is at best only a slight resemblance.

But there are, we are told, other types of metaphysical problems, and other methods of "solving" or "dissolving" them. The "friends of Cambridge" are not confined to one method of procedure in these matters any more than to one criterion of truth! Most metaphysical questions, Wisdom thinks, are of the nature of what he calls "conflict questions" like the dispute about whether the dog goes round the cow or vice versa. That is to say, they are questions calling for a "decision" rather than for the discovery of the answer.

Here the contending parties, he claims, are arguing not about the facts or about what happened, for they both know this, but rather about how these facts shall be stated or described. And the reasons which each gives for saying that the dog went round the cow or vice versa are in fact explanations of what *they* are going to *mean* by "going round". The dispute arises because one side insists on using one criterion and the other another; and it can be settled only by deciding which criterion they are going to use, and agreeing to talk accordingly.

Hence we get summarised on the last page of the article Mr. Wisdom's recipe for solving, or "resolving" as he calls it here, all metaphysical problems; and, we shall see, it is really based upon the fact that *he* has "decided" to adopt a limited definition of facts and a particular meaning or account of meaning, truth and philosophy of his own. And this is true also of the "friends of Cambridge", most of whom would follow him in this. "The metaphysical dispute", he says (p. 497), "is resolved by explaining what induces each disputant to say what he does. This is done as follows: 1. Explain the nature of the question or request; (a) Negatively —remove the wrong idea that it is a question of fact, whether natural *or logical*; (b) Positively—give the right idea, by showing how, as in other disputes of this unanswerable sort, the questions are really requests for a description of (1) those features of the use of the expressions involved in the questions which incline one to answer 'Yes' and of (2) those features of their use which incline one to answer 'No'. . . 2. Second there is the work of providing the descriptions that are really wanted."

First then (a) we explain that the question is not a question of natural fact, i.e., it is not a scientific difficulty; and this we do by pointing out that it is not the case that from one theory we can make one sort of prediction about what would be observable with the senses under such and such conditions, and from the other theory another set of different predictions, so that we can settle it simply by finding out

whether, under the conditions specified, the sense observations are to be had. We thus remove the wrong idea that it is a matter of natural fact; but also (b) that it is a matter of logical fact. The question of natural fact is answered by experiment. The question of logical fact is answered by finding out what the correct English usage is and deciding to adopt this or some other agreed meaning.

Supposing that the issue is: does A mean the same as B, where this is a reductive metaphysical issue? Now X will say that A means the same as B because of 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., and here under the numbered headings he will draw attention to certain facts about A and B which would incline one to say that they mean the same, whether they justify one in saying this or not. Y likewise draws attention to certain other facts which disincline one to say that they mean the same, whether or not they justify one in saying that they mean something different. Now whether or not 1, 2, 3, 4, justify one in applying the term "means the same" is, it is claimed, a logical question (in a rather extended sense of logic) to be answered by examining the usage of "means the same". Often this logical question can be definitely answered. But it is beside the point in metaphysics, we are told. Whether or not it happens to be the correct usage to call something which has features 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, an A is a matter of verbal propriety. It is the facts mentioned under 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, to which attention is drawn in whatever language, correct or incorrect, they are summed up. Take, for example (p. 459), the case where two people are disputing about whether or not something is poetry. One says that it is because—and then he mentions a whole list of facts about it, say, 1, 2, 3, 4. Another says that it is not because—and then mentions other facts, say, 5, 6, 7, 8. Out of this argument there emerges a pretty full description of so and so's works, e.g., that it has features 1 to 8 inclusive. The further question, after it is seen just what Mr. so and so's work is like, whether we call something that has features 1 to 8 inclusive, poetry or not, is a question of what we are going to mean by the word

poetry, and not a question of exactly what Mr. so and so's work is like. The latter, the factual matter, has already been answered by giving a full description of it, far fuller than the description one would give by saying merely that it is poetry. Such a remark just sums up shortly and less precisely the much longer and fuller description given jointly by the opposing views. Thus Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* (5.5563) says, "Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete there are. Philosophy really is purely descriptive."

To the question whether it is not possible to give a wrong description the reply is that any short description will be necessarily incomplete and rather summary. If something has a rather complicated nature, classifying it under one heading or another does not give an exhaustive description of it. Often therefore it may be wrong in the sense that it is not exhaustive enough; it is an incomplete or imperfect picture. But it may also be wrong in that it fits none of the usual classificatory predicates. For example, typical poetry has a recognised metre of a certain kind and a rhyme scheme. Typical prose has no regularly recurrent stress and no rhyme. Now there may be a border line case, with, for example, no rhyme and some tendency towards regularly recurrent stresses. It may also contain the picturesque language that typical poetry has, that is to say, it may have some, but not all, of the marks of poetry, and some, but not all, of the marks of works of prose. If one says of it that it is poetry one suggests what is false, viz., that it has perfectly regular stresses and a rhyme. If one says of it that it is prose one likewise suggests what is false. Both descriptions will therefore be misleading, and much better than giving either would be to give a full description of what features it has, both the poetic and the non-poetic features. When one knows all this one knows exactly what it is like and the question "Is it or is it not poetry?" is no longer a question of what features it has, but of what terminology we shall use to describe these features which we all know.

In other words, it is not a question of fact but "a question about language" (p. 493), "a matter of how words are used" (p. 457).

The person's metaphysical puzzle then, in this case, is "resolved" or "dissolved" by showing him in this way that his question is really a verbal one. In other cases, such as analysis, what one does is to show the person that his request is really a self-contradictory one, and thus get him to give up one of his demands or desires. But showing that what he demands is impossible will involve giving a very full description of the thing about which there are these different and conflicting accounts or opinions, with the result that he will now have the whole answer and no problems. He will know exactly what it is like and consequently will no longer worry much about what name to give it, since he knows what it is.

Thus philosophy, which since the days of Socrates and Plato has been regarded as an investigation into the *meaning* of the facts or reality, is now declared to be concerned solely with a *description* of the facts. The *meaning* of the facts—in so far as these philosophers would admit the expression at all—is merely the accurate and complete description or representation of the facts; and the propositions in which this "meaning" is expressed are presumably true—in so far as they would call them true—when and in so far as they represent, describe or give a picture of the facts or of reality. This bears out our earlier contention that behind all the subtle argumentation (both of the Logical Positivists and the supposedly more enlightened Cambridge philosophers) there lurks the crudest possible correspondence theory of truth.[2] Indeed Wittgenstein himself (although writing earlier than Wisdom) appears to draw this very conclusion in the *Tractatus* (4.121) where he says, "The propositions show the logical form of reality. They exhibit it." But even he seems to appreciate the difficulties of such a representative

[2] So much is this the case that many Logical Positivists have been forced to give it up and revert to what on examination may prove to be a still more unsatisfactory coherence theory of truth.

theory of knowledge when he hastens to add that "Propositions *cannot* represent the logical form: this mirrors itself in the propositions". And "That which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent. That which expresses itself in language we *cannot* express by language". Nevertheless, he says (2.17), "What the picture *must* have in common with reality in order to represent it after its manner—rightly or *falsely,* is its form of representation". And (2.172) "The picture, however, *cannot* represent its form of representation; it shows it forth." (Our italics.)

I leave to the Cambridge philosophers themselves the interpretation of these enigmatic statements regarding the difficulties involved in the theory of philosophy as "description". What I wish to notice more particularly is how this position is arrived at and the assumptions upon which this view of the nature of philosophy is based. For it seems to be reached only by arbitrarily ruling out (of possible discussion at any rate) facts which cannot be verified in sense-experience, i.e., all facts other than empirical, scientific or material facts, on the *assumption* that, while the former cannot, the latter *can* be verified (presumably because "picturable") by sense-experience, and are therefore the only ones capable of being described. For, as Wisdom himself has so amply illustrated, how can we possibly "describe" in any intelligible manner (i.e., such as will satisfy him and his friends) such queer entities as relations or universals, essences or forms, moral or spiritual values? Wittgenstein too puts this very clearly and thus seems to support such a view when he says (6.53), "The right method in philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e., the propositions of natural science, i.e., something that has nothing to do with philosophy; and then always when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate that he had given no meaning to certain things in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—but it would be the only strictly correct method."

In both these representatives of the Cambridge School there is what appears to be the dogmatic assumption that the only facts concerning which meaningful statements can be made, and which can therefore be a matter of discussion, are natural or scientific facts, i.e., those capable (as they seem to think) of being verified in sense-experience. This confirms our contention throughout that they still adhere to the verification principle, in the sense of verifiable by sense-experience, since they are not prepared to admit as intelligible or capable of being discussed anything other than what can be "pictured" and verified by sense-experience.

It is pertinent therefore at this point to ask again, "How is a fact verified, and what kind of fact does science verify?" That there is a piece of lead of such and such a complicated, accidental shape and weight? Surely not! But rather that the atomic weight of lead is such and such. Such facts are not verified by sense-experience, but by deliberate control of phenomena or sense-experience. But how sense-experience can possibly control, test or evaluate sense-experience these philosophers have never attempted to explain to us. It is obvious, however, that the power of initiating and foreseeing sense-experiences, of devising experiments, etc., is *not* the power of sensation—whatever "obscurity" the Cambridge philosophers may find in the conception of such a faculty and whatever difficulties they may experience in tracing its operation and results. They do not know what a scientific fact (or truth) is, apparently. No amount of sensations will give the scientific fact, which is a timeless and impersonal truth. The scientific fact is not a sensum but a complex of universals. A cheese is cheese because it has the same specific gravity, molecular structure, etc., as other cheeses, and not because it is a bundle of sensations, which no mere sense-experience could ever award reality or identity with other bundles of sense-experiences.

The "facts" about which *they* are talking, however, (and to which they would confine philosophy) are apparently capable of being apprehended or known infallibly by every-

one, for we are told that both parties to the dispute about the cow and the dog *know* the *facts*. Their description is wrong only in the sense that it is not exhaustive enough; it is an incomplete or imperfect picture. There is thus no need, it would seem, for any interpretation of the facts, and consequently metaphysics is purely descriptive. These must therefore, on Mr. Wisdom's own showing, be the facts of immediate sense-experience, i.e., sense-data or sensible qualities, and *not* the objects which are known *through* immediate experience, and which are generally held to be capable of misrepresentation (cf., the bent stick in water) and to be more than the sensible qualities. For as he himself admits, statements about sensations do not mean the same as statements about physical objects; otherwise he would be explicitly conceding that we know something more than sensible qualities.

Wisdom would thus seem to stand convicted of another inconsistency, or else to be impaled upon the horns of a dilemma. For it may be maintained that I have misrepresented his position, because he has not ruled out any of the facts mentioned (as is indicated by the poetry example —another instance of misleading analogies!); that, on the contrary, what he has said is that it is only when all the reasons for, or all the facts which incline one to, each of the conflicting theories are fully stated and placed side by side, that we have anything like an adequate description of the facts, which will thus include all these other non-empirical facts. If this is so then he is admitting that such facts *can be known* and described satisfactorily; and since they are not known by the senses they must be known by some sort of rational faculty, which he has already declared to be so problematic and obscure a way of knowing that its deliverances are entirely unsatisfactory.

On neither interpretation, however, has he in any sense solved the philosophic problem or explained the facts. For either all the other facts, including moral, religious and aesthetic values, which give rise to beliefs and intuitions of,

hopes for and aspirations after, meaningfulness in the sense of a certain plan, design or purpose in the nature of things, are merely subjective feelings and sensations (as on the first interpretation they would necessarily be, and as many of the "friends of Cambridge" seem to regard them); in which case they are for them all the more real and in need of an explanation other than mere description, which has not been given. Or else they, and the essences, forms and relations which such people normally talk about are objectively real and valid; in which case also all the problems still remain of how and why all these things are as they are, of how and why they are related to one another and to sensible facts, of how the particular thing is both a one and a many, permanent and yet apparently changing, and of how they are all related to me in such a way as to form a whole which can give rise to joy and sorrow, hope and fear, obligation and aspiration, happiness and misery, etc. On both theories all these things are *real* and the problems which they create concerning their interrelations, etc., have not been touched at all.

In fact Mr. Wisdom has dealt with or "solved" none of the questions with which, as he himself has shown, all philosophers heretofore have been concerned. All that is recommended now is that we "describe" the facts; the unity presumably as well as the diversity, the permanent as well as the changing, etc. (though how it is possible to do this remains a mystery) and the problems are "solved" by being ignored—"explained", as we have said, by being explained away. He has "solved" none of the problems he himself recognises and raises. All he has done is to tell us that the facts are so and so—one cow and many contingent qualities, etc.—but how this can be so he has not explained. Yet people will continue to ask this question, and to believe that Wisdom has been less honest than the father of modern scepticism, Hume, who admitted that he had failed in his task and had not met the philosophic demand. "In short", he says,[3] "there are two principles which I cannot render

[3] Appendix to the *Treatise on Human Nature* (last paragraph).

consistent" (and could there be a more accurate summary or a truer commentary on Mr. Wisdom's whole position in this Article?) "nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz., that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connection among them, there would be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to renounce it as insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis that will reconcile those contradictions". I leave it to others to compare and contrast this attitude of Hume's with the claim of Wisdom and his friends to have "solved" or "resolved" all these metaphysical difficulties which troubled Hume so much and to have done so merely by stating them, or carefully recording the facts on either side. Hume, who described them with a precision and exactness which the neo-Humeans must envy, would no doubt, like many of us, have found it difficult to understand why there are for them no longer any contradictions, when they claim they are even more clearly stated (if that be possible), and he would have questioned their right to use such words as "resolve" or "dissolve" in any significant sense.

Explanation of the kind indicated, which is what most philosophers seek, is not merely a matter of description, which for Wisdom, it is to be noted, is usually effected by what amounts to analysis. All that the contending parties in any metaphysical argument or discussion are concerned to do apparently is to reduce or analyse things into their component parts. But, as Plato has demonstrated in the *Theaetetus*, there can be no explanation this way unless the parts themselves are analysed and so on ad infinitum. It was just this kind of approach that made Plato or Socrates so dissatisfied with the thought of all his predecessors (as can

be seen in his account in the *Phaedo* of his own intellectual development), and which led him to extend the scope of philosophy by including the phenomena we call values and morals, and relating them to other phenomena—a widening which meant a new conception of the nature and function of philosophy, more like our own pre-Cambridge one than the purely scientific one we get in the pre-Socratic. For it meant that philosophy was no longer merely description of the world as we apprehend it through the senses. It was an attempt incidentally to do that, but also to include, relate and explain certain other phenomena such as values, which we do not apprehend through the senses. And it was just for this reason that it was traditionally regarded as the first genuinely logical and philosophical doctrine in the history of thought.

But the modern Cambridge philosophers, as represented by Mr. Wisdom, would have us put the clock back and accept their bare dogmatic assertion that Philosophy is merely description, in spite of the fact that all philosophers since then, including Hume himself, have regarded their task as being one of interpreting or explaining the facts. And can we really be expected to do this? For what is the actual situation with regard to the two opposing parties in any metaphysical argument? The fact surely is that each regards himself not merely as describing some or even all the facts, but as interpreting and explaining them, for they both put forward a *theory* about them. It is not merely the case that they are concerned, or think themselves concerned, to ask, Does this mean the same as that? Can so and so be translated into or reduced to so and so? But rather, What do all these things mean? Can they all be seen to be the expression or outcome of one principle, and what is this principle? Both scientist and philosopher are alike in this, that they not merely describe facts but try to co-ordinate the various facts in accordance with certain laws or principles. Now a *theory about* the facts is surely different from a *description of*

the facts, or at any rate Wisdom has not explained how and why they are the same.

Further, each party to the dispute claims not only that his theory is an accurate description of the facts, but also that it is a *true interpretation* of them. And we do not solve this problem merely by pointing out that one person has accurately described some of the facts omitted by the other. For the problem will still remain as to what is the true interpretation of all these facts. But it is extremely difficult to see what "true" or "interpretation" can possibly mean for Wisdom and his friends, on their view of the nature of philosophy.

The question of truth is, of course, as he has already told us, really "insignificant" for him (p. 453); "fact does not matter" (p. 493); it is all a "matter of language" (p. 493), of "how words are used" (p. 457). But the very fact that he uses the term "verification", attaches such importance to it and reveals such anxiety to get it, presupposes that there is truth and absolute truth at that, since, as already indicated, the term implies some way of proving a statement *true*. Further, he and all his followers, as will be seen, unconsciously assume a Correspondence Theory of Truth and a particularly crude version of it too. It is perhaps necessary, therefore, at this point to look with some care at the kind of thing they are accustomed to say in this connection, or when faced with this line of objection.

In principle, they tell us, all metaphysical disputes are of this general kind, i.e., "conflict questions"—which they immediately qualify in the usual fashion by saying—but not merely of this kind! That is to say, there are other features about them too. To some extent, they claim, they may at times be concerned with experimentally, or observably, verifiable matters, and to that extent they may be settled by the application of the Principle of Verification. But they are often the expression of different world outlooks, attitudes to life, or fundamentally different ethical views. They admit that it is not *merely* a matter of using a word in one way

or another, for if it were then it would be hard to understand why people debate these things so warmly. But, they say, just what a particular metaphysical assertion is or amounts to, cannot generally speaking be discovered by studying that assertion in isolation. One has to see what a person does with it, what experiences, if any, he would take to confirm or refute it, what reasons he advances for it, what he counts as relevant, what sort of essential attitude he has towards his assertion, and so on. All these, they point out, are data about what that assertion amounts to; and in particular the reasons advanced for and against an assertion are data about what the assertion means.

When one asks what it means, then, for a metaphysical assertion to be true, or what the test of the truth of such an assertion is, we are usually told that here again different people *have meant* different things by "true". Some have held, implicitly if not explicitly, that a proposition is true only if it can be verified as true by observation in experience (e.g., some Logical Positivists); and this has led people to say that metaphysical assertions are not true, i.e., not the sort of thing that can be true, and therefore nonsensical. But surely they are assuming here that a metaphysical statement must conform to *some* test, which it is proposed should apply to propositions in general, and therefore the question arises what test *they* are going to apply? Is it or is it not verifiability in sense-experience? They continue, however, by conceding that the opponents of such a theory, who claim that some metaphysical assertions at least are true, would normally agree that such assertions cannot be verified in experience by observation. But since they nevertheless call them true, *they* must have in mind some other criterion of truth than this. The contention, therefore, is that to ask whether metaphysical assertions are true is in a way itself a conflict question, or at least an ambiguous one, because *it all depends on what you mean* by the true in this context.

To this the only reply that can be made is that it will of course always be ambiguous, and there is no possibility of resolving the conflict without recognition of facts independent of my assertion about them. Propositions are true, as we have contended throughout, when they assert as fact what is fact; and this fact, as well as the assertion of it, must be something independent of the perception of it. It is fact and fact alone that determines whether propositions are true or not. And the point at issue is, do the Cambridge philosophers, or do they not, recognise that we know anything beyond the contents of any given experience? Stout's whole point in "Mind and Matter" (although Wisdom in a footnote appears mistakenly to refer to him for support) is that we always know more than we immediately experience. But the Cambridge philosophers claim that they have here "no axe to grind"! What one has to do, they say, is to examine the writings of any philosopher to discover what *he* takes to decide whether or not a metaphysical assertion is true, i.e., in order to find out what *he* means by true; and if his metaphysical assertion satisfies *his* criterion of truth, then it is true *in his sense of true.*

To the objection that there is consequently for them no such thing as absolute truth, i.e., something which is true not merely for me, or for this or that particular person, but for all men at all times and under all circumstances, they reply that one might just as well say that there is no such thing as the absolute length of a table, since there is only its length in inches and in centimetres, etc. If an assertion is true in Mr. X's sense of true, then it is true in that sense for him and for everybody else at all times and in all places.

Now it is clear from the above that they are *not* willing to admit the existence of independent facts, which determine whether the propositions they make are true or not. This is to deny that the table is an object in the external world, with a certain character or being of its own, which is independent of the various appearances it has to different percipients. The moon, for instance, appears larger on the

horizon than it does overhead, and we can account for its different appearances only by setting up some hypothesis which will explain the appearances. Otherwise we shall have to say what is self-contradictory, viz., that it has different sizes. The whole business of learning consists in setting up hypotheses in this way to explain the apparent facts; on the assumption that the universe is a cosmos and not a chaos. And if the Cambridge philosophers are prepared to take the latter view then there is no rhyme or reason in anything—including their writings! In other words, we have to accept the ultimate rationality of the universe, together with all that this implies in the way of only one correct hypothesis, one true explanation, etc. And it must be remembered that it is on the assumption that there *is* order in the universe (other than any order which we may introduce into or impose upon it) that all advances have been made in the sciences, and therefore, according to the Principle of Verification, which they admit to be a legitimate test, at any rate for the Logical Positivists (although, as we have tried to demonstrate, it is no principle at all, much less an adequate one), this assumption has been, and is being, progressively proved true.

They usually proceed, however, to illustrate their position further by pointing out that if, e.g., you take a term like "doctor", which has two quite different senses, in one of which it means a physician and in the other of which it means the possessor of a higher degree at a university, and ask "Is so and so a doctor?" the answer is "In one sense of the word he is, as a doctor of science, but in another sense he isn't, viz., as a physician." And this is parallel, they claim, with the question "Is this proposition true?" The answer can only be "In one sense of true it is, and in another it isn't." When, therefore, a Logical Positivist says of an assertion that it is true, he means that it predicts certain experiences under certain conditions, and under these conditions the experiences eventuate.

To this one need only reply that this then is *his* test of truth, and he is surely simply dogmatising here, or arbitrarily laying down a criterion of truth which is his own. But when we, on the other hand, say of a metaphysical assertion that it is true, we mean that the relationship which it asserts between concepts or terms corresponds to a real relationship existing between the entities or objects to which the terms refer, and which exist independently of anyone's cognising, asserting or judging about it or them.

At this point the line they usually take is that when a Logical Positivist says that "God exists" is not a true proposition, what he means is perfectly true, viz., that this is not a proposition predicting certain sense-experiences which anyone would have under certain conditions and such that we would get them. In his sense of true what he says is true.

But surely the Logical Positivist is going on the assumption that God is a sense-datum, which is absurd; and all one can say of him, therefore, is that he means by God what no one else does. To ask that God should appear as a sense-datum is quite ridiculous, for by God is meant the one and only self-existent being on which all others depend; whereas a sense-datum is only an element in human experience. In addition to the sense-datum there is also the awareness of it, which is different from the sense-datum itself. In other words, there is cognition as well as the sense-datum cognised. If, therefore, human experience goes beyond sense, or is greater than sense-experience, surely God, on whom human experience is supposed, by those who use the concept, to depend, must be far greater than a sense-datum? And anyone who asserts or implies otherwise is being utterly absurd, for he is saying what no one in his sane senses has ever said or thought of saying.

We can agree, therefore, that there is no sense-datum that can be called God! But if this is all the Logical Positivists mean to say, then it is an assertion that is not worth making, since no one would ever think of questioning it. When, however, the person who believes in God says that

this proposition is true, he means that what he asserts in it corresponds to an actually existent fact, independent of him or his assertion. But to this they usually reply that, while they are not sure what such a criterion amounts to, they are prepared to admit that it is quite likely true in his own sense of true. They generally profess, however, to be far from clear as to what sense this is—even when it is explained that the criterion is the facts of the external world, and that these facts are there is borne out by the fact that we have certain experiences. The immediate recognition that we are finite beings implies a contrasted or corresponding knowledge that there is an Infinite Being. Otherwise we would not be aware of ourselves as finite, but as self-existent and the sole existent being. There is no escape from this unless they are prepared to take refuge in solipsism. There cannot be a dependent being without an independent ground of the finite being's existence—unless they retort that "ex nihilo nihil fit" is not true; in other words, that we live in a chaos. And if they are prepared to do this then there is no logical refutation of their position. All we can do is to point to a contradiction between their theory and their practice, e.g., if they experience a sudden blow in the back they will turn round and ask *what* hit them!

More serious, however, is the question of what they mean when they say of a proposition, as above, that it is "true for me", or "in my sense of true", but "untrue for a Logical Positivist", or "in his sense of true", for surely on their own assumptions there is an infinite regress here. If true is to be taken as meaning "true for me", or "true in my sense of true", what they are really saying is that *it is true* that it is true for me or in my sense of true. That is to say, they are claiming truth for their own statement (or they would not trouble to put it forward at all in this connection) which, on this view of truth, is equivalent to saying that it is true for me (or in my sense of true) that it is true for me (or in my sense of true) . . . and so on ad infinitum. But when they say that the proposition "God exists" is true for a

particular person or persons because they happen to mean so and so by God, they mean that *it is true* that it is true for them, with the result that "truth" in one sense in which they are using the term is regarded as something timeless, objective and eternal. It is fact, i.e., something that must be recognised, for when one asks why, the only answer they can give is "It is a fact." Otherwise there is no point in making the statement at all, as they evidently realise, and they have no right to expect anyone to attach any importance to it. In the other sense in which they are using the word, however, it means that something is only *true for me.* They are thus using "truth" in two contradictory senses, and they must make up their minds which they are going to accept. If they refuse to acknowledge timeless, objective truth, which is the only kind of truth that has any significance for the rest of the world, and which alone, therefore, it is the business of the philosopher to seek, then they are involved in an infinite regress, and there is no possibility of escape.[4]

When, however, one presses them to state clearly whether or not their position is that truth and falsity apply only to

[4] See Wisdom's account (pp. 456-464) of the senses in which, and the circumstances under which (e.g., to a Red Indian, p. 487), it is legitimate or "correct" to describe a motor cycle as "a sort of horse". "Correct" is presumably just another word for "true" and means here, apparently, "true for or to" the Red Indian. It seems to mean something different, however, when he claims (p. 455-6) that his own statement about the metaphysical nature of the Verification Principle *is correct*: "And to illuminate this" (i.e., its metaphysical nature) "I say that it is a sort of metaphysical theory; and for our purpose it does not matter whether it is a sort of metaphysical theory (a) in the way that a hackney is a sort of horse, or (b) in the way that a motor cycle is, because it is a sort of tireless horse on wheels. If (a) my statement is correct; if (b) it is not." To which he immediately adds "But this correctness is of no importance." And in a footnote "Except while it is thought to be." In other words, the absolute, timeless, objective truth doesn't matter, except in so far as someone happens to think it does! All that matters is what we happen to find "illuminating", by which he apparently means useful for certain purposes, e.g., "to draw attention to certain likenesses", what is convenient, or what works, etc. The question therefore remains—what status are we to accord to Wisdom's own "correct" or "true" statement? Is it true merely in the sense in which his statement to the Red Indian is true? For if so, then he cannot escape the infinite regress. But if, on the other hand, it is on a supposedly higher level, then on his own showing, it is of "no importance", and on ours it is a contradiction in terms.

individual meanings or statements made by someone on definite occasions with a definite meaning, i.e., his own particular meaning, it is customary to be told: "Well, this is a common enough sense of truth, and one which we happen to be thinking of at the moment. No doubt there are other senses that have been and might be used, according to which something other than this could be called true or false, but *we* are not called upon to supply them." But surely they have already *said it is true* that this is the sense in which the word true is being used at the moment, and also that this is a *true* sense of true. In other words, they have made, and are always making, a timeless judgment, and it is only because they use the word "truth" ambiguously that there is any plausibility whatever in their assertion. The appearance of probability is due to the fact that they covertly introduce the very notion of timeless truth, which they expressly (though not in so many words) deny. And they cannot have it both ways.

When one asks why *they* are not called upon to supply it, they claim that here we are up against the principle of tolerance, and that they are, as Wisdom has put it (p. 465), the "people with no axe to grind in the way of a theory of metaphysics", by which they can only mean that everyone has a right to set up his own criterion! But surely it is they themselves who are most intolerant, for it is they who are dogmatising or laying down an a priori definition, and they ought therefore to accept it. They point out, however, that this question amounts to asking what *ought* we to mean when we say that something is true? And their contention is that if practically everyone always meant just one thing, then there might be some point in saying that we *ought* to mean this when we speak, i.e, that we ought, in order to avoid misunderstanding, to adopt the usual convention. But even so, they say, it might be desirable at times to break a convention. Here, however, the situation is that, in a metaphysical context, at least some people give the word one meaning and some another. In order to communicate with another person

we have to agree on a common usage, or at least to understand each other's usages. But what grounds, they ask, would there be for saying that one usage was the only correct one? As an illustration they point out that the British people, e.g., use the word "homely" to mean comfortably domesticated. Americans, on the other hand, use it to mean ugly. For Anglo-American conversation, therefore, we must adopt one usage or understand each other's usage. But who is to say which is more correct, or why one should be more right than another?

And from our point of view this is the crucial question, regarding which we require an unequivocal answer, viz., is there or is there not an external reality about which we are talking? For if there is then the word "ought" has a very different meaning—indeed it is only then that it can have any significant meaning at all. We *ought* to mean by truth that which is in some sense (see possible definition above) in accordance with external reality, and by false that which is not. Both British and Americans have to agree about the meanings they are going to attach to the terms they use; otherwise they will not know to what external realities they are attached. And this is the *only* reason why they must agree about this. But no amount of "agreement" about or study of linguistic usage can possibly solve the conflicts that arise, e.g., between A who says that there is nothing but sense-data and B who says that there are also data of intellectual experience (and implied in all experience), of which data the existence of God is one. Further, if one asks which comes first—the proposition or the meaning—the answer is, obviously, the meaning. The proposition is, as Plato would say, *for the sake of* the meaning. "Meaningless proposition" is, as has been argued earlier, an abuse of terms meant to describe artificial pseudo-propositions, which are mere imitations invented by the Logical Positivists and the Cambridge philosophers (see Wisdom's examples of "the purple Union Jack", "the perfect pulley", etc.) to travesty the real thing.

But when one emphasises in this way that it is now clearly admitted that it is "all a matter of language" (as their more enthusiastic followers are accustomed to put it), or of how we "decide" or "agree" to use terms, they point out (quoting Wisdom, p. 493) that "It is, however, very necessary to understand what sort of a question about language it is." Their contention is that it is obvious that we must agree what is meant by "true" before we can discuss whether a proposition is true or not. But if two people agree what *they are going to mean* by true (note the usual "slide" here from "what truth means" to what someone or other "is going to mean by truth") i.e., what criteria they are going to accept for truth, then it is not merely a matter of language. Normally what they have to do is to see whether the thing in question has these criteria or not. For example, if they use the American sense of "homely" it is a matter of looking at the faces under discussion and not of language at all.

But they are clearly now bringing in "fact" here, and admitting that it is the fact in the external world that is the criterion. It is objective fact, they are saying, that determines both the definition of itself and of truth, or what is meant by truth; while they deny this elsewhere in their arguments, as we have seen, with the result that they are either abandoning the whole position or else again falling into contradiction. In other words, what they are really conceding is that when we say a proposition is true we mean that it is a statement of the actual features of the thing. When pressed in this way, however, they usually point out that this is not a completely unambiguous statement, for it all depends upon what is meant in any given case by "the facts determining" the truth of the proposition. And so the argument "goes round and round" and never "comes out" anywhere! For, by reason of their respect for the principle of tolerance apparently, our protagonists constantly retreat from every position, and retract every statement, with sublime disrespect for the principle of contradiction!

It would appear to be the case, for example, that it is now conceded that it is not the Logical Positivist criterion that determines the truth of the proposition, for one would think that they cannot have it both ways. But as usual we have reckoned without our adversaries, who immediately round back on us to the effect that it would be just the same if we agree to admit or accept the Logical Positivist meaning of truth. That is to say, it would not be merely a matter of language; it would be a matter of seeing whether the proposition can be verified or not. And if we accept someone else's criterion we will have to do something different and so on. In other words, the criterion they propose to accept on some occasions is verification in sense-experience, and not by the facts in the external world. Well may the simple-minded wonder why (apart from the obvious impossibility of applying or accepting different criteria in this way without constantly being involved in contradiction) we should at any time or on any occasion accept the Logical Positivist criterion, whose inadequacy they themselves have already admitted elsewhere, and which has been shown to be completely fallacious and useless—indeed, to be not a principle at all! And in any case why should we *accept* the Principle of Verification unless it is in some sense *true* whether we accept it or not? But they never offer, nor can they on their own premises offer, any reason why we should "agree to admit" or accept this or any other so-called criterion.

It is in this way, however, that they seek to evade the charge of (a) relativity, i.e., that on their principles there is only what is *true for* a particular person or what corresponds to or satisfies his notion or definition of truth; and (b) that consequently they are involved in self-contradiction, because the first "true" they use is, and always must be, used in a different sense, viz., in the sense of absolute truth. They do not assert, they claim (any more than do the Logical Positivists), that a certain proposition is true *for* Smith, but at most that there are or could be different *senses* of the word "true", or different *criteria* of truth. In conformity with

their professed principle of tolerance, they are prepared to admit or agree that there are two or three or more (as you wish, they say) senses of "true", e.g., true in the sense of verifiable in sense-experience or empirically verifiable, true in the sense of coherent with the bulk of other accepted propositions, or true in the sense of useful, etc. That being so, they argue, we might say of a proposition P that it is true, if by "true" you mean coherent; and of this whole proposition we might assert that it is true, and might mean "true" in the sense of verifiable, or coherent, or whatever you wish. Therefore, it is claimed, they are *not* saying it is *absolutely true* that something is *true for* a particular person; but perhaps something like "it is true in the sense of verifiable, both that P is false in the sense of not useful, and true in the sense of coherent" or some such thing.

To which one need only reply that this in no wise alters the position, for once they make this statement they assert that it *is true* that P is verifiable, and the question still remains—is it *true* that P is verifiable?—true in the one sense that matters, i.e., in accordance with fact, the "fact" being something existing and persisting independently of their or anyone else's attitude to it. They assert, however, that all they mean by different senses of true, is that on different occasions one uses different tests. There is, if you like, they admit, an infinite regress in this sort of way. One applies a test to find out if something is the case, but the test itself may not have been correctly applied. One can always think up further tests, however, and if it is disputed one can apply another test to see whether the previous tests have been correctly applied or not, and so on ad infinitum.

But surely when they take this line they are asserting that there is no such thing as ultimate truth, and an infinite regress gets neither them nor anyone else anywhere. It simply means that things are inexplicable. We can say nothing intelligible about them. The trouble, of course, is that they have never really made up their minds whether or not there is anything beyond sense-experience, and this is

just where they ought to begin, for the fact that there are things independent of us is much more certain than any theory about how we come to know them can possibly be. But they refuse to give a straight and unequivocal answer to the question—is it or is it not the case that there is anything beyond sense-experience, any reality independent of us? In fact their answer, as we have seen, is never a simple yes or no, but always some subterfuge or other. For they seem to realise that if they grant *this* then they would have to admit that truth is the conforming of the proposition with this reality in some sense or other, even though this may not be the only test. But if there is no such reality, then the question of truth does not arise, and there is no point in arguing further with them. They are only talking about their own feelings or immediate experiences, their own private world of ideas, and this is of little or no consequence to anyone else. If they are going to deny external facts or reality, they are back at the position of Hume—that there is only what each person experiences from moment to moment; that the fire is only flickers of light, etc., and in that case no rational explanation can be given, as Hume so thoroughly demonstrated. But, as already emphasised, Hume was courageous enough to declare (in the Appendix to the Second Volume of the Treatise) that consequently the assumptions must be wrong. For he admits here that there is a contradiction which would disappear if a better hypothesis could be found, and he suggests that perhaps someone else, or himself on more mature reflection, might be successful in finding it.

It is worth noting too, that Wisdom himself asserts that the word "round" can only *mean* one thing, for he says (p. 493), discussing the dispute about whether or not the dog goes round the cow "who keeps her horns always toward him, so that she rotates as fast as he revolves", that "There are not in English two uses of 'go round' in one of which the answer is 'yes' while in the other it is 'no'. Had there been, the question would hardly have produced difficulty." And this is equivalent to saying that we must recognise the

facts, that one group of facts can be described by the word "round" and the other cannot. For how could we possibly show which side is right in this conflict of opinion about "going round" without recognising different groups of facts in the external world? Without doing so we can get nowhere. But we must also recognise, what they apparently refuse to recognise, the difference between facts and the sense-experiences through which they appear, and that consequently interpretation, and the possibility of mistake, is always involved.

It is argued of course that when Wisdom says that there are not two uses of the word "round" in English, what he means is that it is in this respect different from, say, the word "doctor", which has two distinct senses, both of which are legitimate and sufficiently understood for people to recognise when a misunderstanding arises that the word is being used in one sense rather than the other. With regard to the expression "go round", however, although some people use it of something that is successively North, East, South, and West and others use it of something that is in front, right, behind and left, it is not the case that these two ways of using it are regarded as equally legitimate. They are seldom clearly distinguished because, as a matter of fact, nearly always when one criterion is present the other is also. The problem, they say, could, if you like, be cleared up by arbitrarily deciding to accept one or other of these criteria in the puzzling case of the cow, where one is present and the other absent. This, however, would not be deciding to adopt one of two recognised senses, but so to speak constructing out of a fluctuating usage an arbitrarily fixed one. This, they say, is a matter of disputation rather than of merely recognising the facts. The point is that if we adopt a usage which applies to this fact we must say "goes round"; if we adopt a usage which does not apply then, consistently with this usage, we must not say "goes round". A usage once having been selected, recognised facts determine what is the right thing to say. They are thus prepared to concede that Mr. Wisdom does admit facts. It is certainly a matter of fact that

the dog is successively North, East, South and West of the cow; it is also not a matter of fact that it is successively front, side, rear and other side. These are facts independently of how we describe them. The point is that if we decide to use the expression "goes round" to stand for the first sort of fact and not for the second, since the first sort of fact is the case, we must say "goes round". If "goes round" is used to stand for the second sort of fact, which is not the case, then we must not say "goes round".

Now what is interesting here, apart from the crucial recognition of "facts" (whatever these can mean for them, and which are surely what the philosopher should be dealing with), is that Wisdom is arbitrarily laying it down that the word "round" can mean only one thing. There is, however, no puzzle in the facts themselves. A linguistic puzzle arises only because of the ambiguity of the word "round". If he arbitrarily uses it in one way to describe a particular group of facts, then it cannot be used to describe a different group of facts to which that use would be inapplicable. But the thing of prime importance, from our point of view, is that it is not the use of words we are concerned with at all (as Wisdom claims when he says that "the question is a matter of language"—by which he means a matter of language only) but the facts. The facts in this instance, however, are clear—both the dog and the cow move round their respective axes, but not round each other—and the statement of these facts can be left to the grammarians.

There is thus no getting away from objective facts—even for the elusive Cambridge philosophers—since, as we have seen, infinite regress, whether of standards or tests, offers no foothold anywhere. But these facts, even on the purely physical or material level, i.e., in the realm of scientific investigation, are neither mere sense-data nor the particular meanings which individuals, for any purpose whatever, may happen to give to their sense-experiences, and which they propose or "agree" to treat as the ideological super-structure thereof —though the Cambridge philosophers give one the impression

all the time of trying to have it both ways by tacitly suggesting or illegitimately assuming that when they talk about the ideological super-structure which they create or "agree to accept" as a "methodological device", they are speaking also about, or "describing", the facts as they are given. This is the confusion which lies at the back of the whole Cambridge position, against which we have been arguing throughout. But since Stout has, with inimitable clarity and unanswerable logic, provided the refutation of just such a position, once and for all one would have thought, it is fitting to bring this discussion to a close, by quoting the relevant passage from "Mind and Matter" at length.

In the section entitled "Is the physical object a mere conception?" (p 201) he says, "On this view the conception of physical existence, with all that it implies, is logically no more than a methodological device without which Common Sense and Science could not trace the order in which sensa occur. This leads to an extreme subjective idealism of the sensationalist type, with its inevitable implication fully admitted. Just because it is consistently followed out it refutes itself. Its essential motive is to confine knowledge only to what is actually experienced or experienceable. In the attempt to do this it has to posit an order regulating the occurrences of actual and possible sensa, which far transcends any data that can be directly found in actual sense-experiences taken by themselves. On the contrary, it cannot be conceived or described without supposing as its condition an immense range and complexity of physical things, events and relations. To treat these as merely useful figments is logically suicidal. There is no ground for believing in the order according to which sensations occur, which is not *eo ipso* a ground for believing in the order of physical existences, without which the sensational order cannot be conceived or formulated. It is true that the working hypotheses of science may be, and perhaps always are, more or less fictitious. But this yields no support to the proposal to treat the whole physical system as a figment. The scientific hypothesis, however

inaccurate it may be considered as a transcript of what really takes place in the physical world, always proceeds on the presupposition that something of a physical nature does take place. The essential presupposition is that the hypothesis may so far agree with or be equivalent to what really goes on, as to explain observed, and make it possible to predict unobserved facts. The wider and more varied the facts and the more precise the explanation and prediction, the more nearly, in certain relevant respects, is the hypothesis taken to conform to what actually occurs. Compare, for instance, the atomic theory as first formulated by Dalton with the atomic theory of modern physics and chemistry. A further point is that the observed facts which verify or falsify scientific hypotheses are always themselves at least in part physical. If the student of physical science really succeeded in confining himself to mere sensa as they come and go in actual experience, he would find himself without any basis for further advance.

"Actual and possible sensa, and their order, form without doubt an indispensable part of what we ordinarily mean by the material world, but they cannot be all that is required to constitute it, for their order is determinable only by reference to physical factors which are not actually sensated at all. Of these physical factors the body of the percipient is always one; the course of our sense-experience is directly connected with what occurs in this, and only indirectly with what occurs in other physical things."

So far then is it from being the case that philosophy is a matter of "description" merely and that the philosopher, as Wittgenstein counsels, should confine himself to "what can be said" or described, i.e., the propositions of natural science, that there is no such thing as *mere* description. For all description involves some aspect of interpretation, and even at the purely physical or material level there are elements which, as Stout says, are not sensated at all, but as Plato would say, intellectual elements grasped by the mind; with the result that what we have to do at every stage is to

reconstruct the nature of the real. This is what we are doing all the time, for when our senses, which we at first suppose to bring us into contact with reality, are discovered to be subject to illusions, we have to appeal to reason, that much maligned faculty, which Wisdom finds so unsatisfactory, to get us out of the difficulty and tell us which sense-perception is genuine and which not.

The position of Mr. Wisdom and his friends is really a very old and long since discredited one. They object to anything like the Platonic Theory of Forms, i.e., to any theory which asserts the existence of a non-physical element in reality, and that it is the business of the philosopher to know or grasp this permanent element as distinct from the fleeting impressions, because it seems to them to involve the suggestion that there are two worlds, the one perceived by the senses and the other by the mind. Whereas the truth which Plato intended might better be expressed by saying that there is only one world, but that there are different degrees of insight into it.[5] This, however, is declared to be an obscure way of putting things because it is felt to be difficult to conceive of a reality which is not acceptable to the senses.

But such an objection is based upon as crude an idea as it was in the days of Parmenides and can be dealt with as it was then, especially by Plato, by pointing out that we can draw a distinction between the imagination and the reason, and maintain that although we cannot imagine, in the sense of picture, a world that is not physical, i.e., not given to the senses, yet we can and do think about it—whatever Wittgenstein may have to *say* about things "whereof one cannot speak" and about which accordingly "one must be silent"—and indeed must so think the world if we are to have any understanding of it at *any* level of experience; and further, that even the scientist is as we have seen, through the new physics and knowledge of universals and laws, in constant touch with non-physical or non-sensible reality. Other people

[5] For criticism of the "Two Worlds" theory see my paper in the Symposium on "The Alleged Metaphysics in the Republic of Plato"; *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (1945).

too, in personal contacts, while they seem to be aware through sight and hearing only of body, nevertheless know mind and are able to deduce mental processes. We may not be able to imagine people leading a disembodied existence, but actually a person is more than his body and appeals to more than the senses of sight and sound. And the same thing holds even more in the case of moral, religious and æsthetic experience, etc.

This all amounts to saying there is a meaning, value and existence which we cannot apprehend through our senses, but which is just as real as the physical things which themselves even are not sensated at all. And it is the business of philosophy to grasp this meaning. In other words, its problem is to understand the nature and the status of this non-sensible reality, the permanent, necessary or universal element, which cannot be known by mere enumeration of particulars; and explain its relation to the fleeting impressions and the particulars and the physical. And at every stage it is a question, not of "description" at all, but of the true interpretation of all these facts of experience—with the result that not every report is to be accepted.

For Mr. Wisdom and the Cambridge philosophers, however, there is no problem, because they are content, or have persuaded themselves that they are content, merely with a "description" of the facts (whatever that might be, and however it is effected), and feel no desire to understand them —which is perhaps only to be expected since they make no claim to have minds or reason, but only sensory organs and sensations! Indeed they implicitly say this, because they hold that the only things we can be sure of are sensory data. They persistently refuse to admit that we can grasp anything more than sense-data and in doing so they virtually say that we cannot think, for thought always goes beyond sense-datum. So too does sensation itself, if sensation means perception and not mere physical reaction (unconscious) to the environment. Other people, however, are not and will not be content with this. They will want to know, even after

all the facts have been accurately and exhaustively "described" (should this conceivably be possible) and more then than ever, why the facts are as they are and not otherwise; and they will go on desiring this so long as man is man and not a cow chewing the cud and capable merely of sentient perception. Nor will they be inveigled into giving up the desire by all the techniques ever devised. Ordinary people will continue to ask the question "why", for as Meyerson has put it, "The principle of causality is not employed only by the theoretical expert; it is the tool of ordinary everyday men."

Mr. Wisdom and his friends will no doubt say that this is an unfortunate and uncomfortable state of mind to be in; although it is difficult to see what, on their own premises, they can possibly mean by a mind! But, like Socrates, the poor unfortunates will continue to believe that "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied . . ." And they will agree with Wittgenstein that "The solution of the problem of life will be seen in the vanishing of that problem"! For if this statement means anything then it means that the problem of life will be solved when there has ceased to be a problem, i.e., when one is dead; because it is only when life has disappeared that there will no longer be anything to create a problem! Of course it means, we will be told, that the problem is "dissolved". But this, as we have seen, is just another way of saying "explained by being explained away", as a result of persuading us that we really have no problem at all, and that all that ails us is that we are pathological cases, i.e., in a state of irrational conflict of desires, which make contradictory demands; but that we may be cured by submitting to their therapeutic treatment and technique—though again it is difficult to see how such people can have a standard of health, or even where they got such a notion from. All they are entitled to say is that one state is less common than another; they have no grounds for claiming that it is better or more desirable.

Many might resent all this as wearisome arrogance and conceit. Personally I am inclined to be grateful for the attention and concern directed upon my own state of mind —lest perchance I really am deluded and in need of succour. Still one cannot help wanting to be told (though no doubt this is also irrational!) why these people should take such trouble to be benevolent, if there be no objective values and if no one line of conduct is better than another.[6] The only answer, on their own assumptions, can be that they just cannot help it—which is merely to admit that their own conduct is but part of an all embracing chaos, or meaningless existence, "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing".

But I venture to believe that I too, not only in spite of, but in virtue of, my queer state of mind, am also of service to them. For since, in consequence of their own particular view of the nature of predication, the only kind of metaphysical statements that can be made must be either tautologies or contradictions, and since by reason of the fact that *they* are all of sound mind, neither of these will be made or need to be made among themselves, the only possibility of their continuing to enjoy the profession of philosophy is

[6] They usually resent this charge that for them there are no objective values, and claim that they most certainly do say that one line of conduct is better than another. But it is based on taking them seriously when they say that we can accept the Logical Positivist analysis of "ought" into liking, approving, feeling one must or is forced to, etc., and in this way have our problems "solved" or "dissolved". If they have renounced this then, as already indicated, we have no quarrel with them. But there is no evidence that they have. On the contrary, it is one of the professed aims of their therapeutic method to get us to accept it and give up the desire for anything more. If, on the other hand, they are merely saying that ethical judgments are like some judgments of matters of fact, then of course we can agree that this is sometimes the case. But as already emphasised, the question is "are they or are they not different and in what does this difference consist?" And this they have not told us. They have yet to produce their grounds for ethical judgments, for the truth of the matter is that on their own principles (if any) *they can have no such grounds.* They may *say,* but they have no right, or logical colour, for saying, that one line of conduct is better than another. All this can mean for them is that they happen to like it better, or are compelled by the pressure of social convention or the constitution of their own natures, to act thus. What is better? What is good? A good dinner and a heroic act—what have they in common if both are sense-data merely?

dependent upon the fact that I and others like me continue to make contradictory statements and demands. And this at least I can promise to do, although I must plead the privilege of a sceptic and confess that I can see little profit in discussing metaphysical questions, such as what, if anything, is time, or space, or God or the ego, or the relation of the one to the many, etc., with people who say that *no question of fact* is involved!

I must also admit to puzzlement and intense curiosity as to how the Cambridge philosophers can possibly assess the value of other people's work in philosophy. No one can be accused of or blamed for error, because error is all right since it is just an expression of the way the person concerned came to think like that! One person may make two plus two equal four, while another may make it equal five. That any question of fact is involved would be a "wrong idea" (p. 497), though how can there be a "wrong idea" if fact be ruled out? Obviously because it is alleged that it does not correspond to fact, that it is untrue, false! This use of "wrong idea" and temerity in judging other people's opinions shows, as already indicated that behind all the sophistication there lurks a correspondence theory of knowledge of the crudest possible kind. It is surely time that it was dragged out into the light of day and purified; and then it might be realised that truth, whatever else it is, is a conforming of the mind to the real object outside the mind, so that knowledge is an immaterial way of becoming; the self-active mind appropriating the other, as other, and modifying itself without losing its identity.

In conclusion may I say, in the words of Austin Farrar in "Finite and Infinite", that I am well aware that "Some of my friends" may "tell me that what I have discussed is a debased and puerile wing of Logical Positivism that happens to have made a noise. I readily plead guilty to ignorance of the nobler school. It has served my purpose to explain myself by way of answer to the voice which I have actually heard". And I would only add that I am listening now for that other voice—if such there be.

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY WRITERS ON TWENTIETH CENTURY SUBJECTS.

By Arthur N. Prior.

Adam Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments" (1759) and Richard Price's "Review of the Principal Questions in Morals" (1758: enlarged in 1787) mark the culmination of the train of ethical speculation which began with the attempt to refute the "selfish system" of Hobbes, and later developed into a dispute between the Intellectualist and Sentimentalist wings of Hobbes's critics. But they do rather more than that. They show what a remarkable amount of ground that train of speculation covered. There are hardly any major positions that have since been taken up by ethical writers, and hardly any major arguments that have been put forward for or against those positions, that were not already taken up and put forward by the moralists whose labours were finally precipitated in the two surveys which I have mentioned.

Subjectivism and Objectivism.

The twentieth century moralist *par excellence* is, I suppose, G. E. Moore, and the two arguments of Moore's that have been most canvassed are probably that against naturalism in his "Principia Ethica" and that against subjectivism in his "Philosophical Studies". His argument against ethical subjectivism is that if it were true there could be no such thing as a difference in moral opinion, for when A says "X is wrong" he merely means, on this theory, "X excites in me a feeling of disapproval", and when B says "X is *not* wrong" he merely means "X excites no such feeling in *me*", and these two statements are no more inconsistent than "I am going to Cambridge tomorrow" and "*I* am *not* going

to Cambridge tomorrow" when uttered by two different persons. This is no doubt an inside-out version of Sidgwick's argument that "it is absurd to say that a mere statement of my approbation of truth-speaking is properly given in the proposition 'Truth ought to be spoken'; otherwise the fact of another man's disapprobation might equally be expressed by saying 'Truth ought not to be spoken'; and thus we should have two co-existent facts stated in two mutually contradictory propositions" (Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., p. 27). A clearer anticipation of it, however, is to be found in Shaftesbury's "The Moralists, or the Philosophical Rhapsody" (1709; quoted in Selby-Bigge's "British Moralists", 67). Moore argues that if ethical subjectivism were true, there could be no differences in moral opinion; Shaftesbury, that since there are differences in moral opinion, ethical subjectivism is not true. "We find", says one of his imaginary disputants, "perpetual variance among mankind, whose differences were chiefly founded on this disagreement in opinion: the one affirming, the other denying that this, or that, was fit or decent." "Even by this", the other replies, "it appears there is fitness and decency in actions; since the fit and decent is in this controversy ever pre-supposed: and whilst men are at odds about the subjects, the thing itself is universally agreed."

An allied though not quite identical argument (derived from a more general argument of the same type in Plato's "Theaetetus") appears in Price, who points out that one consequence of subjectivist assumptions is "that there is no possibility of mistaking with respect to right and wrong; that the apprehensions of all beings, on this subject, are alike just, since all sensations must be alike true sensations" (S.B. 617). Reid, who came after Price, but not much after, developed this argument a little more pointedly. If, he said, the sentence "Such a man did well and worthily; his conduct is highly approvable" meant the same as "This man's conduct gave me a very agreeable feeling", it would be offensive to contradict it. For while a reasonable man will not be

offended at a difference of opinion about something outside himself, every man must know his own feelings, and to contradict his statements about *them* would be to accuse him of lying. (Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind, 1788, Essay V, Ch. 7. Cf. C. D. Broad, "Five Types of Ethical Theory", p. 260: "On this view there is nothing in ethics to discuss, and it would be mere rudeness to question any ethical judgment that anyone might choose to make".) Reid, however, renders this argument superfluous by another which he puts forward earlier in the same chapter. If, he says, the identification of our moral reactions with feelings is to be taken *completely* seriously, such reactions cannot be rightly expressed in the form of propositions at all. For a feeling, while it may be strong or weak, or agreeable, uneasy or indifferent, "cannot have the qualities of true or false, which distinguish propositions from all other forms of speech, and judgments from all other acts of the mind". *"That I have such a feeling,* is indeed a proposition", and may be true or false, though since no one can know its truth but the speaker, it would be impertinent to contradict him about it. But the feeling itself "is only one term of this proposition; and it can only make a proposition when joined with another term, by a verb affirming or denying". The real point at issue therefore is not what the judgment we make in moral approval is about (whether it is about our own feelings or about the act we are evaluating), but whether in moral approval we are making any judgment at all. Hence in heading this chapter, Reid states his own thesis in the form, *That moral approbation implies a real judgment.*

Modern subjectivists accept Reid's statement of their position, modified only by equating the expression of ethical reactions, not with a *part* of a proposition, but with one of the other forms of speech ("precative", etc.) which Aristotle distinguishes from genuine propositions in the opening of the *De Interpretatione.* In other respects they are obviously and often consciously reviving the positions developed by Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith in the

eighteenth century. Even such a refinement as Bertrand Russell's differentiation of specifically ethical desires from others as "desires about the desires of mankind" ("Religion and Science", pp. 231-7) is implicit in Adam Smith's contention that "the coincidence or opposition of sentiments, between the observer and the person observed, constitutes moral approbation or disapprobation", and his consequent repudiation of Hutcheson's view that we cannot approve or disapprove of the moral reactions of others (Moral Sentiments, Part VII, Sect. III, Ch. III). For Smith as for Russell, it is our attempt to universalise our desires that produces that clash or harmony with the desires of others which constitutes moral disapproval or approval. Smith's further account of the way in which self-criticism arises through the formation of an "impartial spectator" within ourselves after our experience of the criticism of others (Part III, Ch. I) is, of course, an anticipation of the Freudian account of the origin of the "super-ego".

The Naturalistic Fallacy.

Moore's other dialectical achievement, his attack on naturalism, begins with the complaint that "while it may be true that all things which are good are *also* something else, . . . far too many philosophers have thought that when they named these other properties they were defining good" (Principia Ethica, p. 10). He dismisses this procedure as fallacious (the "naturalistic fallacy") because if any of these properties were what "good" *means,* then to say that, e.g., pleasure is good (the good being defined, in this example, as the pleasant) would be merely to say that pleasure is pleasant. Moore's conscious indebtedness is here again to Sidgwick, who criticised Bentham along these lines (Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., p. 27). But the beginning of a hint of Moore's argument is already present even in Cudworth, who suggests in a parenthesis that Hobbes's ethics might make sense of a sort if terms like "good" and "just" were "mere names without any signification, or names for nothing else, but willed and commanded" (Treatise concerning Eternal

and Immutable Morality, Bk. I, Ch. II, Sect. I; Selby-Bigge, 813). In Shaftesbury the hint is clearer, though limited in its application to "theological" naturalism. "Whoever thinks there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is just and good, must suppose that there is independently such a thing as justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true. If the mere will, decree, or law of God be said absolutely to constitute right or wrong, then are these latter words of no significancy at all" (An Inquiry concerning Virtue, Bk. I, Part III, Sect. II). In Hutcheson, with the same limited application, it is far more than a hint. "To call the laws of the Supreme Deity good, or holy, or just, if all goodness, holiness and justice be constituted by laws, or by the will of a superior any way revealed, must be an insignificant tautology, amounting to no more than this, 'That God wills what he wills'" (Selby-Bigge, 173). In Price, not only is this method of argument generalised, but it is introduced by the same distinction as Moore makes between a definition of a moral quality and a test of it. "The phrase foundation of virtue has the different significations of an account or origin of virtue" and of a "consideration or principle inferring and proving it in particular cases". "As to the schemes which found morality on self-love, on positive laws and compacts, or the Divine will; they must either mean that moral good and evil are only other words for advantageous and disadvantageous, willed and forbidden. Or they relate to a different question, that is, not to the question, what is the nature and true account of virtue; but what is the subject-matter of it." And if such "schemes" were true in the first sense, "it would be palpably absurd in any case to ask whether it is right to obey a command, or wrong to disobey it; and the propositions, obeying a command is right, or producing happiness is right, would be most trifling, as expressing no more than that obeying a command is obeying a command, or producing happiness is producing happiness" (Selby-Bigge, 586-7).

Moore, though reproducing this line of argument with an exactness that is all the more surprising because it is unconscious (he acknowledges no predecessor here but Sidgwick), differs from Price in regarding the distinction between good and bad as more fundamental than that between right and wrong. At this point Price is more closely followed today by the "deontological" school of H. A. Prichard, E. F. Carritt and W. D. Ross. Price was the intellectual heir of Clarke, the admirer of Newton, whose comparison between the obligations created by the various relations in which we stand, and differing as the relations differ, and the forces exerted on bodies by other bodies variously disposed in space (Selby-Bigge, 485), is echoed in Ross's picture of our various relationships creating "prima facie duties" which in any given situation have one "duty sans phrase" as their "resultant". Price was better aware than Clarke, however, that this was merely a *description* of rightness, conveying the important enough truth that the moral quality of actions varies with the circumstances in which they are performed, but not a definition of it (S.B., 691-2). Nor did he have any difficulty in disposing of Wollaston's attempt to make a definition out of it by treating all actions as gestures, or acted propositions, and defining the "fitness" of actions to their circumstances, as their asserting the truth about those circumstances, wrong or unfitting actions being those asserting lies (S.B., 1025-8). Price saw in this no more than a description of wrong actions as ones which would only have been right if their circumstances had been different, i.e., as actions which are *not* right, the circumstances being as they are. We say, e.g., that a person who neglects to worship God is guilty of a practical denial of His existence; but why identify the action of not worshipping with the proposition that God does not exist rather than with any other? The only reason that can be given is that only if that proposition were true would the action be right; and we have to know this—i.e., to know something which already involves the conception of rightness—before we can formulate the proposition by the falsehood of

which the action's lack of rightness is supposed to be explained (S.B., 693). Price saw the same circularity in definitions of right actions which merely identify the faculty by which their rightness is perceived. "Explaining virtue by saying that it is the conformity of our actions to reason" is only saying that virtuous actions are "such as our reason discerns to be right" (694). He traces these confusions to the same source as that to which Moore traces the naturalistic fallacy —the attempt "to give definitions of words which admit not of them". Right and wrong for him, like good and bad for Moore, are "original and uncompounded perceptions of the mind".

Nor, Price adds, do the above forms of expression give any practical guidance as to what is right and wrong in particular cases. "For if, after weighing the state and circumstances of a case, we do not perceive how it is proper to act, it would be trifling to direct us, for this end, to consider what is agreeable to them. When, in given circumstances, we cannot determine what is right, we must be also equally unable to determine what is suitable to those circumstances" (695). There is a superficial resemblance here to F. H. Bradley's criticism of Kant's view that morality consists in "fulfilling our obligations simply because they are our obligations" on the ground that "it gives no hint what our obligations are". But Price's position is more like that of Carritt, who points out that Bradley's own formula of performing the duties of one's "station" is in no better case ("Morals and Politics", p. 142), and holds that there is *no* "universal conception of duty" which would "generate its own applications", Kant's error lying not in his failure to provide such a conception but in his imagining that he had done so ("The Theory of Morals", pp. 84-5).

There is common ground here between the critical objectivism of Price and the subjectivism of Hume and Smith. For Smith as for Price, it was impossible to infer any concrete moral precepts from an account of what we mean by calling an action right, though Smith's subjectivism led him to

identify the latter with an account of the subjective mechanism of approval. "In treating of the principles of morals there are two questions to be considered. First, wherein does virtue consist—or what is the tone of temper, and tenor of conduct, which constitutes the excellent and praiseworthy character? . . . And, secondly, . . . how and by what means does it come to pass that the mind prefers one tenor of conduct to another? . . . The question concerning the nature of virtue necessarily has some influence upon our notions of right and wrong in particular cases. That concerning the principle of approbation can possibly have no such effect" (Moral Sentiments, Part VII, Sect. I and Sect. III, Introduction). In his wider belief that our ultimate moral judgments cannot be inferred from any other propositions whatsoever, Price was close to Hume. "After every circumstance, every relation is known", says the latter, "the understanding has no further room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itself. The approbation or blame which then ensues cannot be the work of the judgment, but of the heart" (Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, App. I). The response which Hume attributes to the "heart" is for Price an immediate intellectual intuition of the action's objective moral appropriateness, but he limits the understanding in the sense of "deduction" to the function which Hume assigns to it. In Price this is an admission made to Hutcheson; in Hume, a direct development of him; but either way they agree. Modern subjectivists and objectivists share the same common ground. Hume's lineal descendant is A. J. Ayer, who deduces the emotive character of moral reactions from the fact that when one man tries to persuade another to adopt his own ethical opinion, all he can do by reasoning is to alter his view of the situation in which the moral "judgment" is to take place; if they still have different reactions after that, there is nothing they can do about it except abuse one another ("Language, Truth and Logic", Ch. VI). But the same limitation to the possibility of moral discussion is accepted, from Price's standpoint, by H. A. Prichard, who suggests

that "the plausibility of the view that obligations are not self-evident but need proof lies in the fact that an act which is referred to as an obligation may be incompletely stated. If, e.g., we refer to the act of repaying X by a present merely as giving X a present, it appears, and indeed is, necessary to give a reason. In other words, whenever a moral act is regarded in this incomplete way the question, 'Why should I do it?' is perfectly legitimate. This fact suggests, but suggests wrongly, that even if the nature of the act is completely stated, it is still necessary to give a reason, or, in other words, to supply a proof" ("Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?", *Mind,* 1912).

Naturalism and Idealism.

There is a persistent confusion between "the question as to the nature of virtue" and "the question as to the principles of approbation" in Bentham's curious attack on all his predecessors in Ch. II, Sect. XIV, n., of his "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation". "One man says, he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called a *moral sense* . . . Another man comes and alters the phrase; leaving out *moral* and putting in *common* in the room of it . . . Another man comes and says, that as to a moral sense indeed, he cannot find that he has any such thing; that however he has an *understanding* which will do quite as well." All these and many more are condemned together because "they consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard", that is, of naming any non-ethical property of the action judged which may give a certain indication of its ethical quality. But this is condemning them for not performing a function for which they were never intended. They were put forward, rather, as attempts to explain what was *meant* by saying, for example, that we "ought" to promote the general happiness, or else to explain how we came to perceive that we ought to do so. To this question, Bentham's own closest

approach to an answer is the bare statement that "of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility, one may always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may also say, that it is right it should be done; at least it is not wrong that it should be done . . . When thus interpreted, the words *ought* and *right* and *wrong,* and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise they have none" (Ch. I, Sect. X). It was this passage which Sidgwick criticised as reducing the principle of utility itself—that we ought always to aim at the general happiness—to something very close to a tautology, Moore developing the criticism into his own attack on the "naturalistic fallacy".

In this department of Ethics Bentham was a reactionary, and became the Hobbes of subsequent moralists, who have, as we have seen, simply reproduced the arguments and even the internal divisions of the original Hobbes's critics. Even the English Idealists have given us only a curious mixture of Butler (in their theory of the "realisation" of our "true" selves) and Wollaston—or rather, the caricature of Wollaston set up by Hutcheson for criticism. Hutcheson argued that we may frame as true propositions about wrong actions as about right ones (Selby-Bigge, 448), as if Wollaston had asserted that *the proposition that* a wrong action had been performed was somehow a falsification of the facts—as if he had meant, e.g., that the proposition that a promise had been broken contradicted the fact that it had been made. On such a view, of course, the performance of any wrong action would imply that two contradictory propositions were both true—the breaking of a promise would imply both that it had been made and that it had not. What Wollaston did hold was that *the breach of promise itself*—not any proposition *about* it—was a denial that the promise had been made; so that the fact that a promise was sometimes broken did not mean that the proposition that it had been made was both true and false, but that it was both true and (falsely) denied, as true propositions may very well be, and

often are. But while Wollaston did not hold anything so absurd as the position Hutcheson attributed to him, it is by no means clear that the nineteenth century English Idealists did not hold it, when they attempted to equate wrong action with the self-contradictory and the inconceivable. It is hard to see what else can be made, for example, of this passage from Nettleship's "Remains", quoted with approval in Bosanquet's "Implication and Linear Inference" (p. 95): "Any one who assumes the existence of laws in anything, or who speaks of a 'right' or a 'wrong' in regard to it, really commits himself to the principle that the right in that sphere is equivalent to the conceivable."

Between the Idealists and Bentham there is a certain inner kinship, brought out in their common opposition to the "intuitionism" shared by Price and even Kant with the more direct heirs of Hutcheson. Bradley's complaint that Kant's definition or description of right action is not at the same time a practical criterion of it, is identical with Bentham's complaint against his predecessors. Both attempt also to deduce practical precepts from a purely descriptive account of "the nature of things", though the descriptions from which they start are different enough. In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries a similar link is detectable between Wollaston and Hobbes. One of the latter's attempts to bridge the logical gap between a purely descriptive egoistic psychology and an ethical demand for political loyalty consisted in a comparison between "*Injury* or *Injustice,* in the controversies of the world" and "that, which in the disputation of Scholars is called *Absurdity.* For it is there called an Absurdity to contradict what one maintained in the beginning: so in the world, it is called Injustice and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done" ("Leviathan", Part I, Ch. 14). For Hobbes as for Wollaston, promise-breaking (and especially the violation of one's oath of allegiance) is the acting of a lie, or rather it is to make oneself a liar. He is more successful than Wollaston in reducing all other crimes to this formula,

since for him there is no crime but disobeying the prince to whom our obedience has been sworn; but in this simplicity he falls all the more rapidly under Cudworth's objection, which is applicable to Wollaston also—if there is no undefinable and ultimate difference between right and wrong, in what sense is it wrong to lie? "Were a man naturally unobliged to any thing, then could he no way be obliged to stand to his own act, so that it would be really unjust and unlawful for him, at any time, upon second thoughts, voluntarily to undo what he had before voluntarily done." "Though it be true, that if there be natural justice, covenants will oblige; yet, upon the contrary supposition, that there is nothing naturally unjust, this cannot be unjust neither, to break covenants" (Intellectual System of the Universe, Ch. V, Sect. V, Sub-sect. 28). Bentham, it may be noted, in dismissing Wollaston as "one philosopher who says, there is no harm in any thing in the world but telling a lie", does not raise *this* objection against him; had he done so, he might have perceived that a similar objection might be raised against philosophers who say that "there is no harm in anything in the world but giving pain or withholding pleasure".

Utilitarianism.

The enquiry into the "principle of approbation" tends to be an obsession with modern moralists, and it might be argued that it was also something of an obsession with those of the eighteenth century, whose detailed foreshadowing of later discussions is therefore limited to this aspect of the subject. It is true that, under the stimulus of the Utilitarian movement, the nineteenth century moralists appear to have devoted a much larger proportion of their attention to "the nature of virtue" than either their eighteenth century predecessors or their modern successors. Utilitarianism, however, was not invented by Bentham, and the main arguments both for and against it were as well stated by such writers as Hume and Smith as they have been in any subsequent period.

For example, Mill's comparison of the man who loves virtue for its own sake with the miser who loves money for its own sake, and explanation of both attitudes by the doctrine of association, goes back to John Gay, and is fully considered and criticised by Smith (Moral Sentiments, Part IV). Hutcheson has the elements of a hedonistic calculus, and anticipates Mill's confused classification of pleasures according to quality as well as quantity (Selby-Bigge, 475-8). Sidgwick's elaborate explanation on Utilitarian lines of the main precepts of common sense morality and of the qualifications with which common sense itself delivers them, is explicitly put forward as a development of Hume (Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., pp. 423-5); his union of Utilitarianism and Intuitionism is a deliberate attempt to restore the "friendly alliance" between these two theories which was exhibited by Hobbes's first philosophical opponents (p.86); and his classification of the "methods" of ethics as egoistic, intuitionist and utilitarian consciously or unconsciously reproduces Smith's division of theories about "the nature of virtue" into those which make virtue consist in prudence, those which make it consist in propriety and those which make it consist in benevolence (Moral Sentiments, Part VII, Sect. II).

It is of some topical interest to note also the anticipations provided in the eighteenth century of the criticism or modification of Utilitarianism contained in K. R. Popper's "The Open Society and its Enemies". "All moral urgency", says Popper, "has its basis in the urgency of suffering or pain. It is, I believe, the greatest mistake of Utilitarianism . . . that it does not recognise that from the moral point of view suffering and happiness must not be treated as symmetrical; that is to say, the promotion of happiness is in any case much less urgent than the rendering of help to those who suffer, and the attempt to prevent suffering" (Vol. I, p. 205). "Pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure, and especially not one man's pain by another man's pleasure" (p. 241). That aversion from pain is in fact a more urgent motive to action

than desire for pleasure was already emphasised by Locke, though his statement of the fact is complicated by his confusion between our desires and the "uneasiness" consequent upon their frustration. Hutcheson extended this "asymmetry" to our desires for others ("As the absence of good, is more easily born than the presence of misery; so our good wishes toward the positive good of others are weaker than our compassion toward their misery"), and ultimately from the psychological to the more strictly ethical sphere. He used it to interpret the distinction which he found in Puffendorff between "perfect" rights which may justly be secured by force or litigation, and imperfect rights which may not. He describes the former as rights of which the violation is an infliction of actual misery, while the latter are merely rights to positive benefactions (Selby-Bigge, 176). This view and emphasis was taken over by Adam Smith, who states that "Resentment seems to have been given us by nature for defence, and for defence only", and traces the special stringency of the duty of Justice as compared with Beneficence to the fact that whereas "the mere want of beneficence tends to do no positive evil", "the violation of justice is injury: it does real and positive hurt to some particular persons" (Moral Sentiments, Part II, Sect. II, Ch. I).

On this asymmetry between pleasure and pain, Popper founds a distinction between two types of "social engineering", which he terms "piecemeal" and "Utopian". The method of the former is that of "searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good" (Vol. I, p. 139). The Utopian attempts "to realise an ideal State, using a blueprint of society as a whole" (p. 140). The same distinction is fully developed by Smith, who contrasts "a certain spirit of system" with the "public spirit" which rests on "a real fellow-feeling with the inconveniences and distresses to which some of our fellow-citizens may be exposed". Of the public-spirited man he says, "When he cannot establish the right, he will not disdain to ameliorate

the wrong": but "the man of system" is "often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it" (Moral Sentiments, Part VI, Sect. II, Ch. II). Popper's further inference that the primary question of politics is not "Who should rule?" but "How can we organise political institutions so that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?" (Vol. I, p. 107) is traced by himself to J. S. Mill, but even in Mill it was the recovery of what had been a widely accepted political maxim in an earlier period. Hume, for example, notes that "a constitution is only so far good, as it provides a remedy against mal-administration" ("Essays, Moral, Political and Literary", Essay III).

Parallels of this sort might be multiplied indefinitely. For example, Smith has a critical study of the place of rules in the moral life (Part III, Ch. IV) which follows exactly the same lines as that in Carritt's "Theory of Morals" Ch. XIII; he also devotes some space to the general morality of professional codes, the ethics of "vocation" (Part V, Ch. II). The question, later raised by Kant's "formalism", whether beneficence arising from a spontaneous impulse is preferable to beneficence performed from a sense of duty, was fully canvassed by the Sentimentalists and Intellectualists of the period. The "vitalism" of Nietzsche is foreshadowed in Mandeville. But enough has been said now, not perhaps to justify the elaboration of a theory of the movement of philosophic thought in a succession of cycles, but to establish a more practical contention which has been at the back of my mind during the elaboration of these parallels, namely that a study of the main eighteenth century moralists would form a very complete introduction to ethical discussion and speculation generally, an ideal elementary Ethics course, both for students who will later be advancing in the subject, and for those who will not, but who have included a stage of Philosophy in a degree that is specialised elsewhere.

HUME'S TREATMENT OF IDENTITY.

By J. C. Maxwell.

The purpose of this note is to consider Hume's account of identity in its bearing on the development of his theory of the external world. The only commentary to which it will be necessary to refer is that of Professor H. H. Price who analyses the account on pp. 38-43 of *Hume's Theory of the External World,* and restates it on pp. 45-48. He scrutinises the argument closely, and it is not likely that anything he leaves unsaid has been said elsewhere: at any rate I have come across no other discussion which adds anything of moment to his. What I have to say is complementary to his restatement, which to my mind is a great improvement on what Hume says, while remaining, as he claims (p. 48), truly Humian. My purpose, however, is rather to study the unrevised account in its relation to the rest of Hume's theory.

Hume maintains that a single object can be observed throughout a period of time without derogation to its unity, though in accordance with his view that time implies succession he holds that "'tis only by a fiction" that the idea of time can be applied to an unchangeable (i.e., as Price says, unchanging) object (*Treatise,* I, iv, ii: Selby-Bigge's edition, pp. 200-201). The details of the argument about how we pass from unity to identity do not concern us here: the main point is that a single object can persist (apparently for an indefinite time) provided it is uninterrupted and invariable. The question I want to ask is: What new factor is introduced into the situation by interruption? Hume confidently assumes that interruption makes a difference, and his commentators seem to agree that, on his principles, this is so. It is this assumption that I want to question, and to trace to a

confusion that recurs at several points in this section of the *Treatise*.

We must recall that at this point Hume claims to be accommodating himself to the notions of the vulgar, for whom "those very sensations, which enter by the eye or ear, are the true objects" (p. 202). Consequently to say that an impression, or perception, continues unchanged for (say) half a minute is, for the vulgar, to say that an object has persisted for that period of time. Now suppose instead that it is perceived for ten seconds, not perceived for the next ten, and then perceived again for the next ten. What difference does this interruption make? According to Hume, it alters the case entirely. "The interruption of the appearance occurs contrary to the identity" (p. 205). On the surface, this is a purely verbal point. On page 201 Hume has chosen to define identity as requiring both invariableness and uninterruptedness, so that interruption is analytically exclusive of identity. But we cannot let the matter go at that. For Hume has asserted that the uninterrupted and invariable object which we, by a fiction, call identical, is really single or a unity. And in denying identity to an interrupted object, he is plainly not intending merely to make a statement that follows analytically from his definition of identity, but is also denying to the interrupted object the unity that the uninterrupted possesses. He is, that is to say, making an informative statement about the difference between an interrupted and an uninterrupted perception. Yet his analysis has given no grounds for supposing that the type of object the vulgar believe in has any less capacity of recurring at intervals than of persisting while uninterruptedly perceived. And even if he were right in saying that interruption *is* contrary to identity, he would still be wrong in saying that it (at this stage of the argument) *seems* contrary. It is only if identity analytically implies uninterruptedness that interruption seems (and of course is) contrary to identity.

The natural answer here for Hume and his defenders to make is: of course the two interrupted perceptions are

numerically distinct. "'Tis a gross illusion to suppose that our resembling perceptions are numerically the same" (p. 217). At this point there are two lines that we can follow. In the first place we can admit this numerical distinctness, so long as we revise Hume's whole account along the lines suggested by Price: even the uninterrupted perceptions must be regarded as "a *series*, a continuous series whose members are exactly similar" (*op. cit.*, p. 46). If we do this we must recognise that, even if the result is, as Price claims, Humian, it is not consistent with what Hume is supposed to be doing at this particular stage of his argument. For it involves abandoning the vulgar identification of perceptions and objects: the objects of the vulgar are not, for them, series of resembling items—they are unitary continuants. The other line, which I propose to follow, is to enquire how, without having made this revision, Hume can none the less suppose that unity and interruption are incompatible. The answer is that Hume's argument depends on an equivocation in the word "perception". The perceptions which the vulgar do not distinguish from physical objects are not, as Hume more than once[1] slips into talking as if he thought they were, acts of perception, but something which we perceive. How does this shift of meaning enter into the present argument?

It slips in once on page 201 where Hume talks of the way in which "the unchangeable object is suppos'd to participate of the changes of the co-existent objects, and in particular of that of our perceptions". At this point Price (*op. cit.*, p. 40n.) takes Hume to task for distinguishing, as he is not entitled to do at this stage, perceptions from objects. This is a just charge if we suppose (as Hume himself leads us to suppose) that the word "perception" is unequivocal. But in fact the distinction drawn here between perceptions (=acts of perception) and objects is perfectly valid and, whatever Hume may suppose, perfectly "vulgar", and the criticism

[1] E.g., on p. 207, where the question: "How we can satisfy ourselves in supposing a perception to be absent from the mind without being annihilated" does not, contrary to what Hume suggests, arise for the vulgar. Cf., Kemp Smith: *The Philosophy of David Hume*, p. 480.

against Hume is not that he made the distinction here, but that he failed to keep it up. What he is maintaining here is that acts of perception are transitory and successive, but that, at any rate where invariableness and uninterruptedness are present, percepta, or objects, are unitary and persistent.

But when he goes on to maintain that uninterruptedness is a necessary condition of this unity, he can do so only by slipping again into equating acts of perception and percepta, and fathering this equation on the vulgar. That he does this is particularly clear on page 209 where he argues at length that the interruption of our perceptions is the only circumstance that is contrary to their identity (i.e., if we ignore the complications introduced by Hume's theory of time, "to their unity"). In fact, given his admissions on page 201, and given the true vulgar attitude towards our perceptions (i.e., percepta or objects), nothing is contrary to this identity or unity.

It should be noted that what I have said merely shows that, on Hume's own principles (in his rôle of representative of the vulgar outlook), there is nothing contradictory about the recurrence of the same object at different times. It does not show that there is any positive ground for holding that it does recur, though one could argue *ad hominem* that the grounds for holding it are not radically different from the grounds for holding that the uninterrupted object is a single object rather than a series of resembling objects—this is where Price's restatement scores over Hume's original presentation Still less does it give positive reason for believing in that continued unobserved existence the belief in which Hume is tracing to its roots in the imagination. What I have said is quite compatible with the truth of a great part of what Hume says. But I hope to have shown that, on Hume's own theory as stated on pages 200-201, if there are unobserved objects at all, there is no contradiction in the notion that any such object is numerically identical both at its various appearances and in the intervals between its appearances. If Hume were to argue against this, that he has defined

identity, or the sameness of a thing with itself, as involving uninterruptedness, we could reply that nothing in his argument shows uninterruptedness to be in fact a necessary condition either for our actually asserting, as "vulgar" persons, that an object is the same with itself at different times, or for our being entitled to assert it, always assuming that the "vulgar" principles have not at this stage of the argument been undermined. Thus the introduction of uninterruptedness into what claims to be a definition of identity as predicated by the vulgar is wholly arbitrary. If the vulgar assert identity even in the absence of uninterruptedness, as they certainly do, it is not because they are overlooking a "circumstance contrary to" identity, but because they have refrained from adopting this arbitrary and inconvenient definition.

In what I have said I have not meant to imply that I consider the other criterion (or, on the alternative interpretation, the other constituent of the definition) of identity, invariableness, as immune from criticism. The vulgar are in fact quite prepared to assert identity in the absence of that as well. But Hume cannot so easily be confuted out of his own mouth as in the case of uninterruptedness. Moreover, he has a theory (no doubt not a very satisfactory one) about the way in which we confound "related objects" with "identical" ones (pp. 203-4). In view of all this, I have preferred to confine my attention to the simpler case of the connection of identity with uninterruptedness.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. The Journal Press, Provincetown, Massachusetts. Annual subscription (two volumes): $14.

Vol. XX. First Half, August, 1944. The effect of propaganda upon attitude following a critical examination of the propaganda itself: Rex Madison Collier. Some remarks and results of aptitude testing in technical and industrial schools: W. J. Morgan. A skeptical note

on the use of attitude scales toward war—(II) In 1942: Stanford C. Ericksen. The distortion of syllogistic reasoning produced by personal convictions: John J. B. Morgan and James T. Morton. Correlates of politico-economic liberalism-conservatism: W. A. Kerr. A study of some factors conditioning the social distance between the sexes: Helen L. Koch. Studies of aggressive social attitudes—(I) Measurement and interrelation of selected attitudes; (II) Changes from peace to war; (III) The rôle of personal and family factors: Ross Stagner. Second Half, November. A study of social and political attitudes among members of propagandist societies: Jacques Le Gulf and Pryns Hopkins. Psychological studies in semantics—(I) Free association reactions to words, drawings, and objects: T. F. Karwoski, F. W. Gramlich, and P. Arnott. The relation of first name preferences to age of judges or to different although overlapping generations: M. Finch, H. Kilgren, and K. C. Pratt. Minnesota studies in war psychology—(I) A set of miniature scales for the measurement of attitudes related to morale: William K. Estes and Katherine W. Estes. A comparative study of the college success of recommended and non-recommended students from one Detroit high school: Arthur Harold Brown and Claude L. Nemzek. The comparative value of two geometry prognosis tests in predicting success in plane geometry: Sister Loretta Marie Goddyne and Claude L. Nemzek. The relationship of personality test scores to school marks and intelligence quotients: Leo Spinella and Claude L. Nemzek. The responses of Catholic, Protestant and Jewish students to the Menace Checklist: Bert R. Sappenfield. Facing post-war Germany: W. Eliasberg. Vol. XXI. First Half, February, 1945. The cultural functions of social stratification—(I) Regarding the genetic bases of society; (II) Regarding individual and group dynamics: Raymond B. Cattell. A comparative study of the names of White and Negro women college students: Oran W. Eagleson and Antoinette D. Clifford. Relation of childhood and adult leisure activities: Catherine Patrick. *Q*-scores, temperament, and delinquency: S. D. Porteus. Judgments of state legislators concerning public opinion: George W. Hartmann. Permanence of clerical interests in relation to age and various abilities; Samuel F. Klugman. The interests and attitudes of Japanese, Chinese and White adolescents—A study in culture and personality: Raymond G. Kuhlen. Second Half, May. Level of aspiration as a method of studying personality—(IV) The analysis of patterns of response: Julian B. Rotter. Have the neurotic tendencies of the students at the University of Hawaii increased since the war began?: Madorah E. Smith. Group conflict and social reform: H. G. Schrickel. The "insight interview" approach to race relations: Mozell C. Hill and Thelma D. Ackiss. Comparison of attitudes towards Japanese language schools expressed by young Americans of Japanese ancestry in 1937 and 1942: Katsumi Onishi and Madorah E. Smith.

Attitudes of students toward the Japanese: John J. B. Morgan. An experimentally created conflict expressed by means of a projective technique: Beatrice A. Wright. Personality changes from acting in a play: William M. Timmons. Social influences on perception of complex drawings: A. S. Luchins. Vol. XXII. First Half, August. Clinical validity of the inventory of affective tolerance: Robert L. Watson. A sex difference in opinion: George D. Lovell. Changes in the causes of feelings of inferiority since the outbreak of World War II as listed by students at the University of Hawaii: Madorah E. Smith. A kinetic theory of socio-psychological diffusion: Henry Winthrop. Sex differences in judging the sex of handwriting: Florence L. Goodenough. The relation of masculinity-feminity scores of sorority girls on a free association test to those of their parents: Jane Harris Smith. Psychological studies in semantics—(II) Reliability of free association tests: Theodore F. Karwoski and Fred Berthold, Jr. Second Half, November. A psychological study of Stalin: Charles Prince. Personal values and religious backgrounds: Asahel D. Woodruff. The values of Negro women college students: Oran W. Eagleson and Eleanor S. Bell. Studies in beauty—(II) Some determiners of the perception of beauty in women: Milton Rokeach. The use of interviewer rapport as a method of detecting differences between "public" and "private" opinion: Frederick Williams and Hadley Cantril. Cultural conflict and the feminine rôle—An experimental study: Georgene H. Seward. A mutual validation of personality traits: Joseph Jackson. Vol. XXIII. First Half, February, 1946. Attitudes toward Soviet Russia—(I) The standardisation of a scale and some distributions of scores; (II) Beliefs, values, and other characteristics of pro-Russian and anti-Russian groups: George Horsley Smith. The relative effectiveness of paper-pencil test, interview, and ratings as technique for personality evaluation: Joseph Jackson. An experiment in group guidance: Isaac Jolles. The identification of cases of chronic motion sickness during military screening examinations: H. M. MacPhee and L. A. Pennington. Season of birth and mental ability of prison inmates: Raymond Corsini. Psychological aspects of speech-melody: Louise Zucker. Second Half, May. Attitudes toward the British—Churchill and the war effort: Gertrude Hanchett. Relation between government and the status of women: Catharine Patrick. World reconstruction and the concept of distribution of mental abilities to races, nations, and social strata: Sigismund Peller. Students' reactions to their given-names: Oran W. Eagleson. The sociological validity of primary social attitude scale No. 1—Religionism: Leonard W. Ferguson. A study of the physiological differences between musicians and non-musicians—(I) Blood-pressure: Lloyd Frederick Sunderman. Broadcasting to an enemy country—What appeals are effective and why: Floyd H. Allport and Mary Mathes Simpson. Vol. XXIV. First Half, August. The relation-

ship of Bernreuter scores to parent behavior, child behavior, urban-rural residence, and other background factors in 100 normal adult parents: Cecil H. Patterson. What is intelligence?: H. H. Goddard. Are Jewish or Gentile children more clannish?: Adeline Harris and Goodwin Watson. Identifiability of nationality characteristics: Frederick H. Lund and Wilner C. Berg. Toward an occupational social psychology: William H. Form. A study of the factors in the identification of handwriting: M. E. Tresselt. Health indices in relation to age, sex, race, and socio-economic status: Frederick H. Lund, Earl R. Yeomans, and Ellwood A. Geiges.

THE ECONOMIC RECORD. Journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Melbourne University Press. Price: 5s.

Vol. XX. No. 39, December, 1944. Some Aspects of Full Employment (I): J. M. Garland. The Uniform Income Tax Plan (1942): K. H. Bailey. The Australian War Economy, May-October, 1944: H. Burton. Vol XXI. No. 40, June, 1945. The Australian War Economy, November, 1944—May, 1945: H. Burton. Some Aspects of Full Employment (II): J. M. Garland. Rents in Melbourne: W. Prest. Professor Douglas' Production Function: J. Williams. Trends in the Concentration of Operations of Australian Secondary Industries, 1923-1943: C. P. Haddon-Cave. Economic Problems of Control in the Milk Industry: C. D. Finch. No. 41, December. The Transition to a Peace Economy: H. Burton. The First Four Reports of the Rural Reconstruction Commission: A. B. Ritchie. Sydney Wholesale Fruit and Vegetable Prices: J. Lindsay. The Growth of New Zealand's General Government Debt: E. P. Neale. The Future of Federal Aid: G. L. Wood. A "Made to Measure" Tariff: W. J. Rose. Full Employment—The British, Canadian and Australian White Papers: D. H. Merry and G. R. Bruns. Vol. XXII. No. 42, June, 1946. Some Post-War Problems: L. G. Melville. Applications and Extensions of the Karmel Formula for Reproductivity: Colin Clark and R. E. Dyne. Australian Income Tax, 1945: H. S. Carslaw. Insulationism and the Problem of Economic Stability: C. G. F. Simkin. The Psychological Assumptions of Economics: Kenneth F. Walker. Production Goals for Primary Products: K. O. Campbell. Prospects of Full Employment in Australia: J. S. G. Wilson. Social Accounting: Dudley Seers.

OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. Quarterly. National Institute of Industrial Psychology, London. Annual subscription: £1.

Vol. XVIII. No. 4, October, 1944. Training for Occupational Psychology: C. B. Frisby. A Technique for Surveying Employees' Opinions and Attitudes: Winifred Raphael. Some Reflexions of Record

Keeping: May Smith. Note on the Training of the Adolescent through Leisure Pursuits: C. B. Frisby. Some Aspects of Organised Training: A. I. G. Hewitt. An Experiment on Change of Work: G. H. Miles and O. Skilbeck. Vol. XIX. No. 1, January, 1945. The Ex-Service Man in Civil Employment: R. A. C. Radcliffe. An Investigation into the Allocation of Labour in a Filling Factory: Valerie C. Stone. A New Cambridge Unit of Research in Applied Psychology: K. J. W. Craik. The Rationale of Scientific Selection (I): R. Cockett. The Rationale of Scientific Selection (II): I. J. Blain. Unrest and Changes in Juvenile Employment: E. G. Greenwell. No. 2, April. The Reluctance to Teach: Rex Knight. A New Post-primary School Record: Mary Cockett. The Young Absentee: E. G. Greenwell. Some Reflexions on Juvenile Employment: James A. Goodbrand. Incentives within the Factory: W. B. D. Brown. Training Workers' Representatives: Christina Hyde. War Office Selection Boards: F. I. de la P. Garforth. No. 3, July. Vocational Psychology and Choice of Employment: E. Patricia Hunt and Percival Smith. Notes on Problems of Selection and Training in War and Peace: E. A. Bott. Some Differences between Boys and Girls in Vocational Guidance: M. B. Stott. The Work of the Admiralty Psychologists: Alec Rodger. 'Vocational Education' in Nazi Germany: Karla Schwelbová. Safety Propaganda: R. E. Tugman. No. 4, October. Interviewing Candidates for Technical Appointments or Training: N. A. B. Wilson. Psychological Methods of Personnel Selection in a Women's Service: Edith O. Mercer. Vocational Guidance in a Scottish County Area: John Meiklejohn. Vol. XX. No. 1, January, 1946. War-time Applications of Psychology—Their Value to Industry: Morris S. Viteles. The Economics of Vocational Selection: Patrick Slater. Industrial Assessment—Some Problems and Suggestions: Alice W. Heim. A Selection Technique for Pre-Apprenticeship Courses: L. J. Drew. No. 2, April. The Psychology of Participation: Gordon W. Allport. An Experiment with Group Methods in the Selection of Trainees for Senior Management Positions: John Munro Fraser. Some Psychological Views on Salesmanship: R. W. M. Krauss. The Juvenile Employment Service—Four Comments on the Ince Report: Alec Rodger. Staff Transfers and Promotions: J. V. Bosly. The Short Personnel Selection Interview: B. D. Misselbrook. No. 3, July. The Army's Use of Psychology during the War: G. N. Tuck. An Employer's View of the Future of Industrial Relations: Charles Bartlett. "Unfit on Psychiatric Grounds": J. R. Rees. A Psycho-dynamic Approach to Industrial Relations: John Munro Fraser. The Influence of the War on Juvenile and Adolescent Vocational Interests: P. M. Freeston. A Note on Professional Standards for Psychologists in Australia: P. H. Cook.

NOTES AND NEWS.

ANNUAL CONFERENCE FOR 1947.

The Annual Conference of the Association (including the Annual General Meeting) will be held at the University of Sydney from 3rd September to 8th September, 1947. Accommodation for visitors will be available both in the University Colleges and in private homes. Members from other centres are cordially invited to attend the Conference, and those who intend to come should inform the Honorary Secretary (Mr. J. Mackie, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney) as soon as possible. Programmes, when available, will be sent to all members.

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TITLE OF JOURNAL.

The Executive, in consultation with members of Council in other centres, has had the title of the JOURNAL under consideration. It was feared that there might be confusion between the existing title and that of "The Australian Journal of Psychology", to be issued by the Australian Branch of the British Psychological Society. The Executive has decided to alter the title of this JOURNAL to "The Australasian Journal of Philosophy", and the present issue will be the last under the old title. The name of the Association remains unaltered.

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With this issue Professor John Anderson, who has edited the JOURNAL since 1935, relinquishes the Editorship. The new Editor will be Mr. J. A. Passmore, M.A., of the Philosophy Department of Sydney University. Mr. Passmore hopes, without any restriction of the scope of articles published, to strengthen the JOURNAL on the reviewing side.

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ANALYSIS.

The journal *Analysis*, which has not been published since 1940, will reappear in October, 1947. There will be six numbers a year, at an annual subscription of 10s. 6d. (sterling). Orders should be sent to the publisher, Basil Blackwell, Broad Street, Oxford, England. Other communications should be sent to the editor, A. E. Duncan-Jones, The University, Birmingham 3, England.

Early articles will include "The Semantic Definition of Truth", by Max Black, "The Russell-Dewey Controversy about Truth and Knowledge", by Karl Britton, and "Questions about the Future of Analytical Philosophy", by A. M. MacIver. Among other contributors will be A. J. Ayer, Herbert Dingle, Dorothy Emmet, W. B. Gallie, G. A. Paul, W. V. Quine and L. J. Russell.